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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation in a criminal investigation often involves a degree
of coercion.  Severe consequences might befall the subject of an
investigation who refuses to cooperate or strike a deal with prose-
cutors.  The subject may have little strategic choice in the matter,
but nevertheless, such cooperation remains voluntary, assuming
that the state actor abides by constitutional restraints.  With the
waiver of rights cooperation entails—notably the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury—comes the age-old carrot of prosecutorial and
judicial leniency.1  The criminal justice system mass-produces this
trade-off on a daily basis.  When a corporation becomes the coop-
erator, some things do change; however, many stay the same.  Cor-
porate liability changes the format of a prosecution inasmuch as
the entity exists as an amalgam of its agents’ actions, but retains its
rights just as an “individual” defendant.2  As its interest demands, a
corporation may waive its rights, including its attorney-client privi-
lege, just as millions of other criminal defendants do to secure leni-
ency.  Corporate privilege waivers, however, have generated
exceptional controversy despite the widespread nature of analo-
gous waivers in the justice system.3  This controversy stems in large
part from recent Department of Justice (“DOJ”) corporate charg-
ing policies that directed prosecutors to consider privilege waivers
in evaluating corporate cooperation.  These policies, some argue,
leave corporations little choice but to waive their attorney-client
privilege.4  Those who oppose waiver practices are powerful and
loud enough that Congress is now contemplating the passage of the
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act: a bill that would prohibit
1. See Michael L. Siegel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver
of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2008); Michael A. Simons,
Vicarious Snitching:  Crime, Cooperation and “Good Corporate Citizenship,” 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 979 (2002) (“Judicial leniency for cooperators traces its roots
back hundreds of years to the common law practice of approvement, and American
prosecutors have been striking deals with cooperators since at least the nineteenth
century.”).
2. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.  It remains important to note
that the Fifth Amendment does not protect corporations, and thus, corporations may
have even fewer rights than individual defendants.
3. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege:  A Response to the Compelled Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
897, 898 (2006) (quoting articles criticizing compelled corporate privilege waivers).
4. See George M. Cohen, Of Coerced Waiver, Government Leverage, and Corpo-
rate Loyalty:  The Holder, Thompson, and McNulty Memos and Their Critics, 93 VA.
L. REV. IN BRIEF 153, 159-60 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/07/23/cohen.pdf.
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prosecutors from requesting or considering waiver of the corporate
attorney-client and work-product protections as a measure of co-
operation.5  Despite the DOJ’s revision of its corporate charging
policy in an effort to appease critics and prevent congressional in-
tervention, supporters of the Privilege Protection Act continue to
argue for the Act’s passage into law.  Against the backdrop of this
struggle between Congress and the DOJ, this Note critically exam-
ines the Privilege Protection Act, and provides reasonable alterna-
tives to the Act’s implementation.
Corporate fraud has and will continue to capture national atten-
tion.  Following the turn of the millennium, billion-dollar frauds at
Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom shocked the markets, wiped out
pensions, and sparked a focus at the highest levels of government
on prosecuting white-collar crime.6  In the wake of these startling
crimes, President Bush created the Department of Justice’s Corpo-
rate Fraud Task Force (“Task Force”) on July 9, 2002.7  More of an
affiliation of existing prosecutorial and investigative bodies than a
new governmental organization,8 the Task Force focused on ag-
gressively rooting out corporate fraud throughout the country.9  At
the Task Force’s fifth year anniversary event on July 17, 2007, for-
mer Attorney General Alberto Gonzales extolled the Task Force
for “obtain[ing] more than 1,200 convictions, including 214 corpo-
rate chief executives or presidents,” and “hundreds of millions of
dollars in fines and restitution to investors.”10  In that same speech,
however, the former Attorney General failed to mention any of the
5. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th Cong.
(2007).  Senate approval remains the only barrier to the Act’s implementation. See
also infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.  Some of the groups who oppose the R
current DOJ corporate charging regime are the American Bar Association (“ABA”),
the Association of Corporate Counsel (“ACC”), and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”).
6. See Daphne Eviatar, What’s Behind the Drop in Corporate Fraud Indictments?,
AM. LAW. LITIG. SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 1, 2007, at 19, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1193821429242.
7. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002); see also Eviatar,
supra note 6, at 19. R
8. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002).
9. Paul McNulty, Former Deputy Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Corpo-
rate Fraud Task Force Fifth Anniversary (July 17, 2007) (noting that “aggressive en-
forcement of corporate fraud is a high priority of the Department of Justice”).
10. Alberto Gonzalez, Former Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney Gen-
eral Alberto R. Gonzalez at the Corporate Fraud Task Force Fifth Anniversary (July
17, 2007).  In response to a request from THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Joan Meyer, Se-
nior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, could not provide a complete list of
cases that were the basis of the victories Gonzalez cited. See Eviatar, supra note 6, at
19 (conducting its own study of white-collar investigations, gathering “data on 124
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Task Force’s significant setbacks, namely a number of acquittals,
mistrials, and convictions overturned on appeal.11   From the per-
spective of some scholars, bar organizations, and former prosecu-
tors, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) arrived at these high
conviction numbers through legally and ethically questionable
means.12  By contrast, the former Attorney General and the DOJ
would maintain that these numbers signify the effectiveness of the
DOJ corporate charging policy in reigning in corporate criminal
conduct in a time of vast indiscretion.
Much of the debate surrounding recent white-collar prosecutions
centers on the practice of government-compelled waivers of the
corporate attorney-client privilege and work-product protections.
Beginning with the Holder Memorandum (“the Holder Memo”) in
1999 and through the McNulty Memorandum (“the McNulty
Memo”) in 2006, the DOJ could request and consider a corpora-
tion’s willingness to waive its attorney-client privilege in determin-
ing whether a corporation sufficiently cooperated in an
investigation and should be spared a criminal charge.13  On August
28, 2008, the DOJ issued new corporate charging guidelines that
deemphasized the role of privilege waivers in evaluating coopera-
tion, but nevertheless directed prosecutors to consider a corpora-
tion’s disclosure of the relevant facts (privileged or not) in their
consideration of corporate liability.14  Since corporate indictments
carry tremendous costs, corporations are understandbly eager to
cooperate by any means possible.15  Thus, corporations often are
compelled to waive their privilege in order to receive cooperation
investigations (resulting in 440 indicted defendants) identified by the Justice Depart-
ment as major Corporate Fraud Task Force prosecutions”).
11. Eviatar, supra note 6, at 20 (“The Corporate Fraud Task Force suffered impor-
tant failures as well . . . .  In all, 27 of the defendants whose cases we examined,
including executives from Adelphia, America Online Inc., PurchasePro.com Inc., and
Qwest Communications International Inc., were acquitted at trial.  Another 28 cases
were dismissed.  There were 22 mistrials.  And nine convictions were overturned on
appeal, including those of such high profile defendants as Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp. banker Frank Quattrone and the Enron ‘Nigerian Barge’ defendants from Mer-
rill Lynch & Co.”); see also United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (holding unconstitutional the DOJ practice of pressuring KPMG to terminate
its advancement of attorney fees to employees); United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp.
2d 330, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) aff’d 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); see generally Stein, infra
note 77. R
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See infra Part I.C, notes 73-101, and accompanying text. R
14. See infra Part I.C.3, notes 102-16, and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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credit from the government, or rather simply to dissuade the gov-
ernment from prosecuting the corporate entity.16
Critics of such practices cite a “culture of waiver” and the ero-
sion of the attorney-client privilege these memoranda engendered,
and that likely will continue even under the DOJ’s revised corpo-
rate charging guidelines.17  In particular, critics claim that the ero-
sion of the privilege hampers employees’ willingness to consult
with corporate counsel, and thus eliminates an early restraint on
illegal conduct.18  Additionally, the prevalence of privilege waivers
likely increases the potential for increased civil liability, since it
provides discoverable fodder for civil plaintiffs.19
In contrast, those who favor current DOJ corporate charging
policies that permit prosecutors to consider waiver of the corporate
attorney-client privilege cite the increased efficiency and effective-
ness of white-collar prosecutions following such waivers.20  They
further argue that aggressive enforcement deters corporate fraud,
and thus protects market integrity for private and public inves-
tors.21  Moreover, the nature of the corporate privilege causes the
very infirmities that critics claim the DOJ memos create.22  A cor-
poration may still waive privileges as it deems fit, particularly
where waiver might permit the corporation to weather a criminal
investigation.  Thus, the corporate privilege, as the Supreme Court
formalized in Upjohn v. United States,23 provides little protection to
16. See infra Part I.C.1-2, notes 73-101, and accompanying text. R
17. See ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, SURVEY RESULTS PRESENTATION 3
(2006), available at http://www.acc.com/resource/v6877 (“Almost 75% of both inside
and outside counsel who responded to this question expressed agreement (almost
40% agreeing strongly) with a statement that ‘a ‘culture of wavier’ has evolved in
which governmental agencies believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to
expect a company under investigation to broadly waive attorney-client privilege or
work product protections.’  Only 1% of inside counsel and 2.5% of outside counsel
disagreed with the statement.”).  It remains important to note the unscientific nature
of this study, which did not adhere to reliable, objective data gathering, instead em-
ploying an informal and anecdotal methodology. See also Press Release, H. Thomas
Wells, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Re: New U.S. Department of Justice Corporate
Charging Guidelines, (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/me-
dia/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=437.
18. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
22. See Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion:  The Corporate Attorney-Cli-
ent Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 313 (2008).
23. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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employees in the first place.  Any expectations otherwise might
very well lack a reasonable basis.
Despite the DOJ’s issuance of revised guidelines, Congress re-
mains on the brink of further altering the current corporate charg-
ing policy.  Senator Arlen Specter originally introduced the
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act (“Privilege Protection
Act”) on December 8, 2006, to end the practice of privilege waiver
under recent DOJ regimes.24  On November 13, 2007, the House
passed its version of the Privilege Protection Act with only slight
modification to the version pending before the Senate.25  Recently,
Senator Specter introduced a slightly revised version of the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Protection Act on June 26, 2008.26  On July 9,
2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey appeared before the
Senate Judiciary Committee and announced that the DOJ planned
to make adjustments to the McNulty Memo, specifically stating
“[we] will no longer measure cooperation by waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege.”27  Following the meeting, Deputy Attorney
General Mark Filip sent a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee
members outlining proposed changes to the McNulty Memo.28  The
letter also requested that the Senate Judiciary Committee allow the
DOJ to alter and implement over a reasonable time a revised cor-
porate charging policy.29  Shortly thereafter, on August 28, 2008,
24. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006).
25. Compare Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th
Cong. (2007), with Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th
Cong. (2007).
26. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008).
This time Specter was not alone in introducing the Act.  Senators Biden, Carper,
Cochran, Cornyn, Dole, Feinstein, Graham, Kerry, Landriue, McCaskill, and Pyror all
joined as co-sponsors.  Senator Webb signed on as a co-sponsor a day later.
27. See Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice:  Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing
July 9, 2008];  Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, AG Mukasey Hints at Revision of McNulty
Memo, Spars with Senators at Hearing, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 2008, http://
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202422864034.  Following the meeting, Deputy At-
torney General Mark Filip sent a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee members lay-
ing out proposed changes to the McNulty Memo.  The letter requested that the Senate
Judiciary Committee allow the DOJ to alter and implement over a reasonable time a
revised corporate charging policy. See Letter from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, and Arlen Specter, Ranking
Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 9, 2008), available at http://
www.acc.com/resource/v9892; see also Evan Perez, U.S. is Revising Rules on White-
Collar Crime, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at A12.
28. See Letter from Mark Filip to Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter, supra note
27; see also Perez, supra note 27.
29. See Letter from Mark Filip to Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter, supra note
27.
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the DOJ issued its revised corporate charging guidelines in an at-
tempt to placate critics.30  While the new guidelines received praise
from Senator Specter and the ABA as a step in the right direction,
both the Senator and the ABA insist that the revised guidelines do
not go far enough to protect the attorney-client privilege.31  Thus, a
new round of Capitol Hill brinksmanship has begun, with the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee pursuing a legislative solution and the
DOJ working to retain its authority over its corporate charging
policy under the revised guidelines.
As the battle continues over revising the corporate charging pol-
icy, legal scholars, practitioners, and bar associations have weighed
in on the Privilege Protection Act’s potential effectiveness.  This
Note analyzes the Privilege Protection Act, focusing on how it
might change corporate white-collar prosecutions.  Part I of this
Note explores the mechanics of the corporate privilege, the devel-
opment of the DOJ’s waiver policy, and the structure of the Privi-
lege Protection Act.  Part II addresses the conflicting views on
whether the Privilege Protection Act will bolster corporate attor-
ney-client privilege, provide for the effective and efficient prosecu-
tion of white-collar crime, and promote ethical prosecutorial
practices.  Finally, Part III argues that the Privilege Protection Act
is a misguided attempt to correct a greater systemic problem with
the corporate attorney-client privilege and the nature of corporate
cooperation.  If Congress is to act, it should recognize the essential
role privilege waiver plays in prosecuting white-collar crime, and
should move to limit the deleterious ramifications to corporations
of routine privilege waivers.  Thus, the doctrine of selective waiver
would be a preferable remedy:  it would protect the confidentiality
of privileged documents that the corporation discloses to the gov-
ernment, and would provide an effective means to balance the cor-
poration’s interest in cooperating with the government and
avoiding unwarranted civil liability.
30. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging
Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-odag-757.html; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, chs. 9-28.000 to -28.1300 (2008) [hereinafter REVISED
DOJ GUIDELINES], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
31. See Press Release, H. Thomas Wells, Jr., supra note 17; Press Release, U.S. R
Senator Arlen Specter, Specter Responds to DOJ’s Revisions of Attorney-Client
Privilege Guidelines (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://specter.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=0aa887f0-f40
c-f557-5dbb-4aef8032b8f9.
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I. THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
WHITE-COLLAR INVESTIGATIONS
A. The Origin and Mechanics of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege
Upon discovery of potential misconduct or a governmental in-
vestigation of its actions, corporations often undertake the strategic
step of initiating an internal investigation to gather information to
respond to the conflict.32  An internal investigation comprises “in-
formation-gathering activities that a company engages in upon
learning of possible wrongdoing.”33  These investigations are usu-
ally tailored to the scope of the potential wrongdoing, at times in-
volving a comprehensive document search and interviews of
employee witnesses.34  Outside counsel is often the key actor in
conducting an internal investigation and presenting legal advice to
guide the corporation through the conflict.35  The fruits of the in-
ternal investigation and subsequent legal analysis allow the corpo-
ration to review the potential misconduct.  Thus, the corporation is
better able to gauge if and what type of liability it may face, and
the necessary corrective actions to take in order to resolve the
conflict.36
The doctrines of attorney-client privilege and work-product pro-
tection provide an essential shield to the corporation and the inter-
32. Gregory S. Bruch & Michael P. Matthews, Conducting Internal Investigations,
in PRACTICING L. INST., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS INSTITUTE 2007
COURSE HANDBOOK 559, 561-62 (2007); see also Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Cor-
porate Investigations:  Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 884 (2003) (“The circumstances that prompt internal inves-
tigations are myriad: evidence of irregular stock trades, allegations of illegal employ-
ment discrimination, the results of an internal audit, an anonymous tip about billing
irregularities, a civil suit, the sudden departure of a key employee . . . .”).
33. Bruch & Matthews, supra note 32, at 561-62. R
34. See id.; see also Duggin, supra note 32, at 891-92 (“While documents may pro- R
vide the clearest record of key events or transactions, the most revealing information
comes from employees.  Thus, the pivotal element of almost every internal investiga-
tion—and the most informative and stressful part for all concerned—is the employee
interview.”); see, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting that an extensive internal investigation yielded 220,000 pages of privi-
leged documents).
35. Bruch & Matthews, supra note 32, at 564-65 (citing, as reasons to retain R
outside counsel, the investigatory skills of former prosecutors that often comprise in-
ternal investigation teams, the independence of outside counsel over internal counsel,
specialized knowledge of the applicable law, and the “increase in likelihood that the
results of the internal investigation will be protected by the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine”).
36. Id. at 561-62.
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nal investigation.37  The Supreme Court, addressing what
protection the Court should provide to the results of a corporate
internal investigation in Upjohn, concluded that the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrines apply to corporations,
and thus where applicable, to the fruits of an internal investiga-
tion.38  As the Court noted of the attorney-client privilege in
Upjohn, “[i]ts purpose is to encourage full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice.”39  In order to facilitate effective legal service, “the
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer being fully informed by the client.”40
Toward the similar end of protecting the attorney-client relation-
ship, the doctrine of work-product protection is designed to protect
an attorney’s mental impressions in preparing for litigation.41  An
37. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289, 307 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the attorney-client privilege should not be “used
as a sword rather than a shield”).
38. See 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (“Our decision that the communications by
Upjohn employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege disposes of
the case so far as the responses to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting re-
sponses to interview questions are concerned.”); infra note 41 for a discussion of the
work-product doctrine.
39. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.  In a frequently quoted refrain, the Court added that
“[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.” Id. at 393.
40. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) (forbidding
an attorney from disclosing any information relating to the client’s case, with certain
exceptions).
41. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.  The Court in Upjohn recognized that the work-prod-
uct protections also apply to counsel during the internal investigation:
[t]he notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are
work product based on oral statements.  If they reveal communications, they
are, in this case, protected by the attorney-client privilege.  To the extent
they do not reveal communications, they reveal the attorneys’ mental pro-
cess in evaluating the communications.  As Rule 26 and Hickman make
clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of sub-
stantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.
Id. at 401.  The Court remanded the case for further determinations on the work-
product protection. Id. at 402; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)
(establishing the work-product doctrine).  In Hickman, the Court determined that
[i]n performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work
with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by oppos-
ing parties and their counsel.  Proper preparation of a client’s case demands
that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
undue and needless interference.  That is the historical and the necessary
way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurispru-
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internal investigation should gain the protection of both the attor-
ney-client privilege (protecting communications between counsel
and employees42) and the work-product doctrine (protecting attor-
ney notes, memoranda, and legal conclusions43).44  While the cor-
porate privilege exists as an amalgam of its agents’ statements and
attorneys’ knowledge,45 the privilege belongs to the corporation
and may be preserved or waived as the corporate entity deems fit.46
The corporate attorney-client privilege exists as something of a
contradiction.  The privilege belongs to the corporate entity, but at
the same time, the corporate entity can only speak and act through
the many officers and employees who comprise the entity.  Never-
theless, the corporate counsel does not represent those individuals.
Rather, counsel must act in the corporation’s best interests, which
at times may be adverse to the employees’ interest.47  In order to
dence to promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests.  This work is
reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in this case as the “Work product of the lawyer.”
Id. (citation omitted).
42. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397; see Duggin, supra note 32, at 895 (“Corporations have R
a right to assert the attorney-client and work-product privileges to protect the confi-
dentiality of corporate attorneys’ communications with client representatives, as well
as notes and memoranda prepared by counsel in the context of an internal investiga-
tion.”); see also PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 5.1 (West Group 2d ed. 2007).
43. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11; see also Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges:
Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And
Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 484-85 (2003) (addressing the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product doctrine in the corporate context).
44. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185-87 (10th Cir.
2006) (discussing the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine in the con-
text of an SEC and DOJ investigation into Qwest).
45. See Liesa Richter, Corporate Salvation or Damnation? Proposed New Federal
Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 142-43 (2007) (“When the
‘client’ to be protected by the privilege is a corporate entity that derives its very exis-
tence from the law and is operated only through the joint efforts of a group of individ-
uals acting on its behalf, the difficulties in applying privilege doctrine become even
more complex.”), available at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/articles/500fl-
spub8853.pdf; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343, 348 (1985) (“As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents.  A
corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers.  Similarly, it cannot directly waive
the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest.  Each of these actions must neces-
sarily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation.”).
46. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (“The parties in this case agree that, for solvent
corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the
corporation’s management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors.”).
47. See Duggin, supra note 32, at 936 (citations omitted) (“In the corporate arena, R
the lawyer lives in an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ world.  The client to whom he owes
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avoid ethical conflicts when conducting an investigation, “corpo-
rate counsel are duty bound to advise employees with regard to
both the scope of the legal representation and the attorney-client
privilege prior to conducting any sort of interview in connection
with a corporate investigation.”48  Typically referred to as “Upjohn
warnings,” these instructions from corporate counsel should make
the employee aware of the nature of counsel’s representation and
that while the corporate privilege protects information discussed,
the corporation may later decide to disclose this information to
others.49  Corporate counsel’s failure to provide sufficient Upjohn
warnings “poses the risk of inadvertently creating a lawyer-client
relationship with the officer or employee.”50  Accordingly, Upjohn
warnings are crucial for a corporate counsel to avoid unethical and
misleading practices, an error likely to harm both the corporation
and counsel.  Although corporate counsel advising employees on a
daily basis presents a different situation than outside counsel con-
ducting an internal investigation, both should provide Upjohn
warnings in their contact with employees.  Theoretically then,
employees should be well aware of what little protection the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege may provide for their communica-
tions with counsel.51  In practice, however, there remains some
question as to the adequacy of Upjohn warnings and the potential
remedies should corporate counsel fail to provide the warnings to
those it interviews.   The quickest solution to that problem would
be to strengthen Upjohn warning practices.52  As some would ar-
gue, the larger problem of erosion of the corporate attorney-client
privilege remains, but this discussion of the nature of the privilege
undivided loyalty . . . cannot speak to him except through [employees’] voices . . . .
He is hired and fired by people who may or may not have interests diametrically
opposed to those of his client [the corporation]. . . . [F]inally, his client itself is an
illusion—a fictional person . . . .  Understanding these difficulties helps, but it does not
resolve the underlying problem.  In conducting an internal investigation, counsel must
serve the interests of the entity itself—the corporation as a distinct legal person—
even in instances where this recognition creates a conflict with the interests of the
officer director or employee who hired the attorney to represent the company in the
first place.”); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Coun-
sel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1013-19 (1997).
48. Brown, supra note 3, at 938.
49. Id. at 939-40 (listing examples of potential warnings corporate counsel might
read an employee before conducting an interview).
50. Bruce A. Green, Interviewing Client Officers and Employees:  Ethical Consid-
erations, PROF’L LIAB. LITIG. ALERT, Winter 2005, at 1, 3.
51. See Richman, supra note 22, at 16-17 (“[T]here is some reason to believe that R
Upjohn warnings have become standard practice.”).
52. See id. at 17.
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should recast the debate in a different light.  If the government
charging policies favoring privilege waiver chill communications
between corporate counsel and employees, the nature of the cor-
porate privilege may hold the greater blame.
B. The Mechanics and Implications of Waiving the Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work-product Protections
After conducting an internal investigation, a corporation might
provide privileged information or attorney work-product to the
government as an efficient means to reveal wrongdoing and seek
cooperation credit.53  The frequency of internal investigations un-
covering any existing wrongdoing has led the government to focus
on obtaining the fruits of such investigations.54  In the corpora-
tion’s attempt to cooperate with the government, handing over
privileged or work-product protected material may constitute a
broad waiver of those privileges and protections to third parties.55
Generally, “[b]ecause confidentiality is the key to the privilege,
‘[t]he attorney-client privilege is lost if the client discloses the sub-
stance of an otherwise privileged communication to a third
party.’”56  Thus, most forms of cooperation involving disclosures
from an internal investigation likely will result in a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.57  This
waiver may extend not just to the material disclosed, but also to the
entire subject matter of the disclosure.58
53. See infra Part I.C.1-2 for a discussion of the DOJ corporate prosecution
Memos (Holder, Thompson, McCallum, and McNulty Memos); see infra Part II.A.1.a
for a discussion of Congressional testimony about the effectiveness of waiving the
privilege and work-product protections.
54. See Duggin, supra note 32, at 892 (explaining the development of internal in- R
vestigations and the government’s interest in obtaining the fruits of the investigation).
55. Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations:  Consequences of the Federal Dep-
utation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 123-25 (2003) (“Since confiden-
tiality is the predominant policy underlying the rationale for the attorney-client
privilege, ‘[a]ny voluntary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege is inconsistent
with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.’” (quoting Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
56. In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006).
57. See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privi-
lege in the Federal Courts:  A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 211, 227 (2006) (discussing the development of subject matter waiver in relation
to the work-product doctrine in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975)); id. at
229-30 (discussing disclosures to the government that may waive privilege and work-
product protections).  However, Part II.2.b infra discusses ways in which a corpora-
tion may sufficiently cooperate without waiving its privilege.
58. Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 227 (“More recent cases from the courts of R
appeal and district courts reflect a view that subject matter waiver may be more lim-
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Courts, however, have developed conflicting interpretations over
what may constitute waiver, and the scope of waiver remains con-
tested ground.59  Six circuits have found that disclosure of privi-
leged material to a federal agency waives the attorney-client
privilege, or possibly even the work-product protection depending
on the submission for the entire subject matter of the material.60
Even in the face of a confidentiality agreement between a corpora-
tion and a federal agency, the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have
held that disclosure of privileged or work-product protected docu-
ments destroys those protections as to third parties.61  Currently,
“only the Eighth Circuit and district courts in other circuits have
held that a selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege applies
whenever a client discloses confidential information to a federal
agency.”62  Thus, as a whole, courts do not seem comfortable with
the Eighth’s Circuit flexible notion of the privilege.  Instead, courts
favor the traditional, absolutist approach.63
ited than suggested in Nobles, and that the limitation will depend upon consideration
of fairness under the circumstances.”).
59. See id. at 220-30 (discussing inadvertent waiver and the scope of waiver).  Con-
gress recently intervened to quell a split among courts as to whether an inadvertent
breach of the attorney-client privilege may constitute a waiver.  On February 27, 2008,
the Senate passed Senate Bill 2450, which provides that inadvertent disclosure of priv-
ileged material to a Federal office or agency in a Federal proceeding does not consti-
tute waiver if: “1) the disclosure is inadvertent; 2) the holder of the privilege or
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and 3) the holder promptly
took reasonable steps to rectify the error . . . .” S. 2450, 110th Cong. (2008) (amending
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
60. See Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 229-30 (“The First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, R
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have expressly held that when a client dis-
closes confidential information to a federal agency, the attorney-client privilege is
lost.”).  In Permian Corp. v. United States, the D.C. Circuit held that disclosure of
documents to the SEC led to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, “[v]oluntary
cooperation with government investigations may be a laudable activity, but it is hard
to understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship.”  665 F.2d
1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
61. See Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 230.  Some courts, however, have held to R
the contrary, “[o]ther courts have suggested that a selective waiver may apply if the
client has clearly communicated her intent to retain the privilege, such as by entering
a confidentiality agreement.” Id. at 238 (discussing the Second Circuit’s opinion in In
re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993), in which the court left open the
possibility of upholding “an explicit agreement that the SEC [or other federal agency]
will maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed materials”).
62. Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 229. R
63. Id.  Discussing the more flexible interpretation of the attorney client privilege,
Broun & Capra note that, “although courts have different views with regard to scope
of waiver, there is authority, both in case law and in scholarly writing, for the position
that the scope of waiver should be governed by considerations of fairness.” Id.
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A growing movement had developed in support of amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence to include Proposed Rule 502, which
would have enacted a “selective waiver” provision to maintain the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protections despite dis-
closure to the government.64  This coalition, however, appears to
have fizzled.65  The ABA seems to have placed its support behind
the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, and the Senate and
Rules Committee seemed to respond to this shift when they elimi-
nated the selective waiver portions from Rule 502.  Congress and
the President since passed Proposed Rule 502 without the selective
waiver provisions.66  Apart from its recent exodus from Proposed
Rule 502, the doctrine of selective waiver would keep intact a cor-
poration’s privilege and work-product protection to private parties,
even though the corporation might have “waived” both in its dis-
closure to the government.67  Selective waiver would allow the gov-
ernment to receive the benefit of a waiver to effectuate its
investigation and the corporation to retain its privilege and work-
product protections as to third parties.68  The doctrine would thus
facilitate the process of privilege waivers by providing greater pro-
tection to corporations from civil suits that often follow fraud in-
vestigations.  In certain respects, selective waiver permits a
64. Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 247 (discussing the language of the rule and R
arguing in favor of the proposed rule).
65. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., No. 21-MC-92, 2008 WL 400933, at
*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008) (discussing the Association of Corporate Counsel, Fed-
eration of Defense and Corporate Counsel, Corporations Committee of the Califor-
nia State Bar, and in general, the defense bar’s opposition to selective waiver in
Proposed Rule 502, because of those groups’ belief that selective waiver would only
further increase the “forced sacrifice of protected materials and communication”); see
also Cohen, supra note 4, at 159-60 (discussing the government and corporations’
original support for the doctrine of selective waiver, and corporations’ subsequent
retraction of their support because of their stated concern “that selective waiver will
just encourage the government to seek waiver more often”).  Cohen’s article further
notes that “[t]he reality behind corporations’ collective change of heart may be in-
stead that, as a result of ‘class action reform,’ the consequences of private litigation
are less drastic than they used to be.” Id.
66. See S. 2450, 110th Cong. (2008).  On September 19, 2008, after the Senate and
the House approved the proposed Rule, President Bush signed Rule 502 into law. See
FED. R. EVID. 502.
67. See Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 246-48. R
68. Id. at 255 (“The [proposed rule of selective waiver] rectifies [the conflict over
‘whether disclosure of privileged information . . . to a government agency . . . consti-
tutes a general waiver of the information disclosed’] by providing that disclosure of
protected information to a federal government agency exercising regulatory, investi-
gative or enforcement authority does not constitute a wavier of attorney-client privi-
lege or work-product protection as to non-governmental persons or entities, whether
in federal or state court.”).
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corporation to “have its cake and eat it too,” gaining both the ben-
efit of cooperating with the government, while also avoiding expo-
sure to litigants waiting in the wings.69  Additionally, policies
favoring waiver generally provide the government with helpful,
timesaving information that expedites white-collar investigations.70
Nevertheless, opponents of the doctrine claim that its enactment
would place greater pressure on a corporation to waive its privilege
and work-product protections and might add a disincentive for cor-
porate counsel conducting an investigation to record findings in
writing, a step that might harm legal representation.71
Under the current DOJ corporate charging guidelines (without
selective waiver) a corporation that is cooperating with the govern-
ment must walk a delicate line to prevent waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protections.  Considering the po-
tential death sentence a criminal prosecution might entail—for in-
stance, the fate of Arthur Andersen—a corporation is likely
inclined to err on the side of cooperation, even if it means risking
increased third party liability.72
C. The Department of Justice Corporate Charging Policies:
From the Holder to McNulty Memos and Beyond
1. An Overview of the DOJ Corporate Charging Polices
Beginning in 1999 with the Holder Memorandum (“Holder
Memo”) and continuing today with the revised corporate charging
69. Finder, supra note 55, at 124.
70. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
71. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., No. 21-MC-92, 2008 WL 400933, at
*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008).  A rebuttal of this argument is at the end of this Note.
See infra Part III.C.
72. See Christopher Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1095, 1097-98 (2006) (“The most notable recent example of ‘deterrence on a
massive scale’ is the indictment and conviction of Arthur Andersen.”).  In 2002, a
Southern District of Texas jury convicted Arthur Anderson for obstruction of justice
in an investigation stemming of out of the firm’s work for Enron.  The Supreme Court
overturned the conviction for an improper jury charge. See Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005); see also Eviatar, supra note 6 (discussing convic-
tions, mistrials, acquittals, and reversals of white-collar cases since 2002). But see
Siegel, supra note 1, at 18-19 (2008) (“The collapse of [Arthur Andersen] as a result R
of being indicted was the exception, not the rule . . . Andersen’s situation was unique
because . . . it was subject to the loss of its ability to conduct public audits upon
conviction. . . . In addition, Andersen suffered because it was a multiple recidivist: it
had recently settled with the government in connection with numerous other claims of
wrongdoing.”).
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guidelines,73 the Department of Justice has recognized the value of
prosecuting the corporate entity in white-collar investigations.74
The DOJ has issued five corporate charging policies (Holder,
Thompson, McCallum, and McNulty Memos in addition to the Re-
vised DOJ Guidelines) over the course of nearly ten years to im-
plement a unified prosecutorial strategy to reduce corporate
fraud.75  Prior to the Revised DOJ Guidelines, the four Memos
placed the emphasis in charging decisions on evaluating the quality
of corporate cooperation, in particular, by considering privilege
waivers and even advancement of attorneys’ fees to certain de-
grees.76  After outrage at and even unconstitutionality of some pro-
visions in the Holder and Thompson Memos, the McCallum and
McNulty Memos provided changes intended to maximize
prosecutorial effectiveness in white-collar investigations, while pro-
tecting constitutional rights.77  After further criticism of the provi-
73. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html;   Memorandum
from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://
www.acc.com/public/attyclntprvlg/mccallumwaivermemo.pdf; Memorandum from
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Compo-
nents and U.S. Att’ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/
2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm; REVISED
DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30.
74. See Duggin, supra note 32, at 868 (“The DOJ currently espouses the view that R
‘certain crimes that carry with them a substantial risk of great public harm . . . are by
their nature most likely to be committed by businesses, and there may, therefore, be a
substantial federal interest in indicting the corporation.’” (citing the DOJ Memos)).
For a discussion of the development of the DOJ Memos from Holder through McCal-
lum, see Wray & Hur, supra note 72.  For an analysis of the McNulty Memo and its R
ethical implications, see  Stein, infra note 77.  For a discussion of the development of R
corporate charging criteria prior to and through the Holder Memo, see Finder, supra
note 55, at 112-20. R
75. See Holder Memo, supra note 73; McCallum Memo, supra note 73; McNulty R
Memo, supra note 73; Thompson Memo, supra note 73; see also REVISED DOJ R
GUIDELINES, supra note 30,
76. See id.; Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Deci-
sion and Corporate Cooperation:  Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 341, 350-364 (2008) [hereinafter Duggin, Corporate Cooperation]
(explaining the evolution of the four DOJ Memos).
77. Duggin, Corporate Cooperation, supra note 76, at 350-364; see Noah D. Stein, R
Prosecutorial Ethics and the McNulty Memo:  Should the Government Scrutinize an
Organization’s Payment of its Employees’ Attorneys’ Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
3245, 3253-56 (2007), available at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/articles/500fl-
spub8305.pdf (discussing the constitutionality of the Thompson Memo); see also
United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding unconstitutional
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sions directing prosecutors to consider waiver of the attorney-client
privilege in their corporate charging decisions, the DOJ again al-
tered its charging policy, attempting to replace the focus on waiver
with a focus on the disclosure of relevant facts.78  The Revised DOJ
Guidelines, however, do not forbid prosecutors from considering
waiver of the privilege in the corporation’s favor and continue to
encourage corporate prosecution on many of the same factors as
the previous Memos.79  In this sense, the DOJ corporate charging
policies were and remain a precarious balancing act of
prosecutorial vigor and restraint.
In the simplest terms, the DOJ corporate charging policies tailor
traditional prosecutorial strategies for prosecuting individuals to
corporations.80  As all of the Memos and the Revised DOJ Guide-
lines recognize, “indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the
government to address and be a force for positive change of corpo-
rate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and
punish white-collar crime.”81  Moreover, the Holder Memo and its
successors encourage cooperation as the means to avoid indict-
ment; all of the DOJ charging policies explicitly direct prosecutors
to consider the value of a corporation’s voluntary disclosure in de-
termining corporate liability.82  While the four Memos cast this
the DOJ practice of pressuring KPMG to terminate its advancement of attorney fees
to employees); United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 541
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
78. See REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30, at 9-28.710 (“In short, so long
as the coporation timely discloses relevant facts about the putative misconduct, the
corporation may receive due credit for such cooperation, regardless of whether it
chooses to waive the privilege or work-product protection in the process.”).
79. See id. at 9-28.200 (“Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the gov-
ernment to be a force for positive change of corporate culture, and a force to prevent,
discover, and punish serious crimes.”); see also Holder Memo, supra note 73; McNulty R
Memo supra note 73 (containing the same language). R
80. See Holder Memo, supra note 73; McNulty Memo supra note 73; Thompson R
Memo, supra note 73; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 72, at 1099-1100 (discussing R
the Thompson Memo’s premises).
81. See Holder Memo, supra note 73; McCallum Memo, supra note 73; McNulty R
Memo, supra note 73; Thompson Memo, supra note 73; see also REVISED DOJ R
GUIDELINES, supra note 30.
82. See Holder Memo, supra note 73; Thompson Memo, supra note 73, § II.A.4 R
(“II. Charging a Corporation: Factors to be Considered . . . 4. the corporation’s timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investi-
gation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client
and work-product protection”); McNulty Memo, supra note 73, §§ III.A.4, VII.2 (“2. R
Waiving the Attorney-Client and Work-product Protections . . . a corporation’s re-
sponse to the government’s request for waiver of privilege for Category I information
may be considered in determining whether a corporation has cooperated in the gov-
ernment’s investigation.”); see also Stein, supra note 77, at 3252 (2007) (“[The revi- R
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evaluation partially in terms of privilege waiver, the Revised DOJ
Guidelines address the same considerations from a “disclosure of
facts” approach, which frequently may involve waiver of the privi-
lege.83  Cooperation is often essential to the success of a white-col-
lar prosecution, since it significantly accelerates the investigation of
complex business records and may allow the government to obtain
all or part of the corporation’s internal investigation results.84  Yet,
despite encouraging cooperation, the DOJ charging policies pro-
vide no guarantee that with cooperation the corporation will avoid
indictment.85  All the DOJ charging policies, however, recognize
“the important public benefits that may flow from indicting a cor-
poration in appropriate cases,” most significantly “deterrence on a
massive [or as the Revised DOJ Guidelines put it, ‘broad’] scale.”86
This Note now directs its attention to the previous charging policy
to the Revised DOJ Guidelines:  the McNulty Memo.
2. The McNulty Memo
The McNulty Memo stood as the DOJ policy on the prosecution
of business organizations from December 12, 2006 to the introduc-
tion of the Revised DOJ Guidelines on August 28, 2008.  Like the
Thompson Memo before it, the McNulty Memo recognized that
“waiver . . . is not . . . a prerequisite to a finding that a company has
cooperated in the government’s investigation.”87  Additionally,
both Memos recognize that waivers will significantly facilitate the
sions in the Thompson Memo] stressed that an organization’s cooperation with an
investigation was the key driver of the government’s decision whether to seek
damages.”).
83. See infra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES.
84. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work-product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 319
(2003) (“Such waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible wit-
nesses, subjects, and targets without having to negotiate individual cooperation or
immunity agreements.”  (internal citations omitted)).
85. See Holder Memo, supra note 73; McNulty Memo, supra note 73; Thompson R
Memo, supra note 73; see also REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30. R
86. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § II.B (“[P]rosecutors should be aware of the R
important public benefits that may flow from indicting a corporation in appropriate
cases.  For instance, corporations are likely to take immediate remedial steps when
one is indicted for criminal conduct that is pervasive throughout a particular industry,
and thus an indictment often provides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a mas-
sive scale.”). See also Holder Memo, supra note 73; McCallum Memo, supra note 73; R
Thompson Memo, supra note 73; see also REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30. R
87. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2; see Thompson Memo, supra note 73, R
§ VI.B (“The Department does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation’s at-
torney-client and work-product protection an absolute requirement [of
cooperation].”).
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investigation88 and “may be critical in enabling the government to
evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the company’s volun-
tary disclosure.”89  While the McNulty Memo retained the Thomp-
son Memo’s nine-factor analysis to guide prosecutors’ corporate
charging decisions, the McNulty Memo implemented noteworthy
adjustments in regards to the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protections that set it apart from its predecessors.
Unlike the Thompson Memo, the McNulty Memo required pros-
ecutors to demonstrate a legitimate need for privileged informa-
tion to fulfill their law enforcement obligations.  To do so,
prosecutors needed to go beyond demonstrating that a waiver is
“desirable or convenient,” and meet a four factor balancing test:
Whether there is a legitimate need depends upon: (1) the likeli-
hood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit
the government’s investigation; (2) whether the information
sought can be obtained in a timely and complete fashion by us-
ing alternative means that do not require waiver; (3) the com-
pleteness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and (4)
the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver.90
If a legitimate need existed, the McNulty Memo then instructed
prosecutors to “seek the least intrusive waiver necessary to conduct
a complete and thorough investigation . . . .”91  The McNulty Memo
directed prosecutors first to request “purely factual information,
which may or may not be privileged, relating to the underlying mis-
conduct.”92  This factual material, to which the Memo refers as
Category I information, consists of items that likely implicate both
the privilege and work-product protections, like “witness state-
ments” or “factual chronologies.”93  Before requesting Category I
information, prosecutors needed to obtain “written authorization
88. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2 (“[A] company’s disclosure of privi- R
leged information may permit the government to expedite its investigation.”);
Thompson Memo, supra note 73, § VI.B (“Such waivers permit the government to R
obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to nego-
tiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.”).
89. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2; see Thompson Memo, supra note 73, R
§ VI.B.
90. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2. R
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (“Category I information could include, without limitation, copies of key
documents, witness statements, or purely factual interview memoranda regulating the
underlying misconduct, organization charts created by company counsel, factual chro-
nologies, factual summaries, or reports (or portions thereof) containing investigative
facts documented by counsel.”); see supra Part I.A-B, notes 25-65, and accompanying
text.
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from the United States Attorney,” who must forward the request
to and “consult with” the Assistant Attorney General for the Crim-
inal Division before acting on the request.94  In determining
whether a corporation has sufficiently cooperated in the investiga-
tion, the McNulty Memo allowed the Government to consider the
corporation’s response to the request “for waiver of the privilege
for Category I information.”95
The McNulty Memo further directed that if “purely factual infor-
mation provides an incomplete basis to conduct a thorough investi-
gation,” prosecutors could seek “attorney-client communications
or non-factual attorney work-product,” termed “Category II” in-
formation.96  Category II information largely consisted of items the
work-product doctrine would protect, such as “attorney notes . . .
containing counsel’s mental impressions . . . or legal advice given to
the corporation.”97  To obtain Category II information, “the
United States Attorney must obtain written authorization from the
Deputy Attorney General. A United States Attorney’s request for
authorization to seek a waiver must set forth law enforcement’s
legitimate need for the information and identify the scope of the
waiver sought.”98  However, Category II information according to
the McNulty Memo “should only be sought in rare circum-
stances.”99  Here, the McNulty Memo also allowed prosecutors to
“favorably consider a corporation’s acquiescence to the govern-
ment’s waiver request in determining whether a corporation has
cooperated in the government’s investigation.”100  Yet, if a corpora-
tion refused to provide Category II information after a formal re-
94. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2.  Additionally, a prosecutor’s request R
needs to establish the legitimate need and “identify the scope of the waiver sought.”
If the request is granted, the United States Attorney “must communicate the request
in writing to the corporation.” Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.  Category II information is also loosely termed opinion work-product, in
contrast to non-opinion work-product, which might consist of facts as opposed to legal
advice or opinions. See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir.
1988) (dividing the work-product protection into “opinion” and “non-opinion” cate-
gories and reserving the most protection for “opinion work product”).
97. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2 (Category II information “might in- R
clude the production of attorney notes, memoranda, or reports (or portions thereof)
containing counsel’s mental impressions and conclusions, legal determinations
reached as a result of an internal investigation, or legal advice given to the corpora-
tion.”); see also Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 226-27.
98. McNulty Memo, supra note 73, § VII.B.2.  Also, “if the request is authorized,
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quest, “prosecutors must not consider this declination against the
corporation in making a charging decision.”101
3. The Revised DOJ Guidelines
Amid heated criticism and the possibility of legislative interven-
tion, the DOJ fought to maintain control over its corporate charg-
ing policy by altering its policies in a way that would both appease
critics and provide for effective prosecution.  During an oversight
hearing of the DOJ before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July
9, 2008, Attorney General Mukasey informed the Committee that
the DOJ would embark upon adjusting the McNulty Memo.  Fol-
lowing the Oversight Hearing, Deputy Attorney General Mark Fi-
lip foreshadowed the changes in a letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee and further requested that Congress stay legislative ac-
tion to allow the DOJ to revise its policy and benefit from a “rea-
sonable amount of time” to review the revisions’ effectiveness.102
On August 28, 2008, the DOJ issued its revisions to the Depart-
ment’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
as a portion of its United States Attorneys’ Manual.103
The Revised DOJ Guidelines present the most significant revi-
sion to the corporate charging policies to date.104  While the Re-
vised DOJ Guidelines retain much of the language from the
McNulty Memo in recognizing the utility of efficient and ethical
corporate prosecutions, the revisions alter the previous memo’s ap-
proach to attorney-client privilege considerations.  The Revised
DOJ Guidelines prohibit prosecutors from requesting waivers of
the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protections.105
Indeed, the Revised DOJ Guidelines emphasize that the “critical
factor” in evaluating corporate cooperation “is whether the corpo-
ration has provided the facts about the events,” not whether the
101. Id.
102. Letter from Mark Filip to Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter, supra note 27.
In his letter dated the same day as the Committee hearing, Deputy Attorney General
Filip offered two proposed changes to the McNulty Memo: (1) “Cooperation will be
measured by the extent to which a corporation discloses relevant facts and evidence,
not its wavier of privileges”; and (2) “Federal prosecutors will not demand the disclo-
sure of ‘Category II’ information—[namely, non-factual attorney work-product and
core attorney-client privileged communications]—as a condition for cooperation
credit.” Id.
103. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 30; see also REVISED DOJ R
GUIDELINES, supra note 30.
104. See REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30.
105. Id. ch. 9-28.710 (“[P]rosecutors should not ask for such waivers [of the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product protections] and are not directed to do so.”).
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corporation has waived its privilege.106  The Revised DOJ Guide-
lines, nevertheless, recognize that “a corporation remains free to
convey non-factual or (core) attorney-client communications or
work product—if and only if the corporation voluntarily chooses to
do so . . . .”107  Thus, the Revised Guidelines conclude, “so long as
the corporation timely discloses relevant facts about the putative
misconduct, the corporation may receive due credit for such coop-
eration, regardless of whether it chooses to waive privilege or
work-product protection in the process.”108  Accordingly, the DOJ
believes that its focus on the disclosure of facts over the waiver of
privilege will downplay the role of such waivers in corporate prose-
cutions.  Yet, in the circumstances of a suspected corporate crime,
the relevant facts and the attorney-client privilege are often inextri-
cably linked in the product of an internal investigation report.109
Sharing of the internal investigation would likely be the most effi-
cient means of factual disclosure, but would also likely waive privi-
lege protections.110  Moreover, the Revised DOJ Guidelines do not
expressly prohibit prosecutors from giving cooperation credit to
corporations for waiver of the privilege; the Guidelines simply
maintain that cooperation must be measured in terms of facts, not
waiver.111  In short, privilege waiver concerns will continue under
the Revised Guidelines.
Although the Revised DOJ Guidelines recast evaluation of cor-
porate cooperation in terms of factual disclosure instead of privi-
lege waiver, the revisions try to walk the near non-existent line
between substantive cooperation and waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.  For instance, the Revised Guidelines note,
[t]o receive cooperation credit for providing factual information,
the corporation need not produce, and prosecutors may not re-
quest protected notes and memoranda generated by the law-
yers’ interviews.  To earn such credit, however, the corporation
does need to produce, and prosecutors may request, relevant
factual information—including relevant factual information ac-
quired through those interviews, unless the identical informa-
tion has otherwise been provided—as well as relevant non-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. ch. 9-28.720.
109. See supra Part I.B (discussing the attorney-client privilege as it relates to inter-
nal investigation reports and disclosure of the report to the government).
110. See id.
111. See REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30, ch. 9-28.710.
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privileged evidence such as accounting and business records and
emails between non-attorney employees or agents.112
Here, the disclosure by an attorney of “relevant factual informa-
tion acquired through those interviews,” would likely constitute a
waiver of the privilege.113  Moreover, the non-privileged evidence
the Revised DOJ Guidelines mention, though likely helpful, could
be obtained through a grand jury subpoena, and thus would not
constitute much cooperation beyond the corporation’s impending
legal duty should a subpoena issue.  Despite the Revised DOJ
Guidelines’ commendable focus on cooperation involving non-
privileged material and giving equal cooperation credit to the shar-
ing of non-privileged and privileged materials, the Guidelines’ em-
phasis on the disclosure of relevant facts about the misconduct
likely will continue to involve waiver of the privilege and work-
product protections in federal corporate prosecutions.114
In addition to the concerns about factual disclosure continuing to
implicate privilege waiver, others have criticized the Revised
Guidelines for its inability to regulate other federal departments’
waiver practices or to reverse the powerful norms the previous
DOJ memos instilled.115  Since the issuance of the Revised DOJ
Guidelines, both Senator Specter and ABA President H. Thomas
Wells Jr. have voiced their support for a legislative remedy that
would control across the board the federal government’s consider-
ation of privilege waiver in corporate charging decisions.  Along
these lines, legislation would presumably be enforceable by a court
should the government violate it, whereas a guidance document in
112. Id. ch. 9-28.720.
113. See supra Part I.B.
114. An attorney revealing the facts culled from an internal investigation report to
the DOJ would likely result in waiver of the privilege, but there may be alternative
avenues of cooperation.  In accordance with the Court’s formulation of the privilege
in Upjohn, however, certain communications with counsel are privileged, not the un-
derlying facts themselves. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96
(1981) (“The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.”).
Theoretically the corporation could bring in a slew of employees to speak with the
government about the misconduct without waiving the privilege.  Nevertheless, the
corporation might run up against employees’ Fifth Amendment rights in this instance,
and the exercise could be frustrated.
115. See Press Release, H. Thomas Wells, Jr., supra note 17 (noting the need for R
regulation that restrains the federal government across the board and Revised DOJ
Guidelines’ perpetuation of the “culture of waiver”); Press Release, U.S. Senator Ar-
len Specter, supra note 31 (calling for legislation to bind all federal agencies, like the R
SEC and EPA and noting “there is no change in the benefit to corporations to waive
the privilege by giving facts obtained by the corporate attorneys from the individuals
in order to escape prosecution or to have a deferred prosecution agreement”).
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the United States Attorneys’ Manual would not be enforceable by
the judiciary.  Moreover, as ABA President Wells points out, “the
Department’s new policy . . . cannot, standing alone, reverse the
widespread ‘culture of wavier’ created by all these federal poli-
cies.”116  Thus, support remains for Congress to push forward with
the Privilege Protection Act.  Whether this support is enough to
bring about the enaction of the Privilege Protection Act is an open
and pressing question.
D. The Privilege Protection Act
Four days before the DOJ announced and implemented the Mc-
Nulty Memo, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Privilege Pro-
tection Act of 2006 (S.30) to curb the same practices the McNulty
Memo aimed to restrict.  At the beginning of the 110th Congress,
Specter reintroduced an identical 2007 version of the Bill (S.186).
On June 26, 2008, Specter introduced a restyled—though substan-
tially similar—version of the Bill (S. 3217).  And even after the is-
suance of the Revised DOJ Guidelines, Senator Specter has
insisted that legislation is necessary to protect the attorney-client
relationship.117
1. The Privilege Protection Act of 2007
Senator Specter introduced the Privilege Protection Act to “pro-
tect the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship by forcing the
Department of Justice to revise its corporate charging policies.”118
In its “Findings” section, the Privilege Protection Act recognizes
that “protecting attorney-client privileged communications from
compelled disclosure” increases corporate compliance programs’
effectiveness, and thus, “fosters voluntary compliance with the
law.”119  The Act also recognizes that “prosecutors . . . have been
able to, and can continue to, conduct their work while respecting
116. Press Release, H. Thomas Wells, Jr., supra note 17. R
117. Press Release, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, supra note 31. R
118. Press Release, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, Specter Introduces “Attorney-Cli-
ent Privilege Protection Act of 2006” (Dec. 7, 2006) (“In his floor statement, Specter
stated . . . ‘I see no need for the Justice Department to publicly express a policy that
encourages waiver of attorney-client privilege, especially where the policy is backed
by the heavy hammer of possible criminal charges.  Cases should be prosecuted on
their merits, not based on how well an organization works with the prosecutor.’”)
[hereinafter Specter, 2006 Press Release] (on file with author).
119. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong.
§ 2(a)(2) (2008).
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attorney-client and work product protections.”120  With these prin-
ciples in mind, the Privilege Protection Act aims “to place on each
agency clear and practical limits designed to preserve the attorney-
client privilege and work product protections available to an organ-
ization.”121  Toward that end, the Act prohibits federal lawyers and
investigators from demanding or requesting that an organization
waive its attorney-client privilege or work-product protections.122
The Act also prohibits “conditioning any charging decision or co-
operation credit on waiver or non-waiver of privilege.”123 Never-
theless, the Act preserves an organization’s ability to voluntarily
waive its privilege and work-product protections, and allows a fed-
eral agent or attorney to accept such a “voluntary and unsolicited
offer.”124  Lastly, the Act permits an agent or attorney of the
United States to request “any communication or material that such
agent or attorney reasonably believes is not entitled to protection
under the attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product doc-
trine.”125  Thus, the Privilege Protection Act places a total prohibi-
tion on requesting or considering waivers of the corporate privilege
and work-product protection, while at the same time it allows vol-
untary waivers.126  The prospective effect of this simultaneous pro-
hibition and allowance remains unclear.
2. The Privilege Protection Act of 2008
The Privilege Protection Act of 2008 is nearly identical to its
predecessor.127  Nevertheless, the Privilege Protection Act of 2008
120. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(5)
(2007); see also S. 3217, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2008).
121. Compare S. 186, § 2(b), with S. 3217, § 2(b).
122. Compare S. 186, § 3014(b)(1), with S. 3217, § 3014(b)(1).  The Act provides a
brief definition for both, but largely relies on common law understandings of the at-
torney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. See S. 3217, §§ 3014(a)(1)-(2); S.
186, §§ 3014(a)(1)-(2).
123. Press Release, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, supra note 31; see S. 3217,
§§ 3014(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), (B)(i); S. 186, § 3014(b)(2)(A).  See Part I.D.2 infra for a
discussion of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008’s essential altera-
tion to an inconsistency in the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007.
124. S. 186, § 3014(d); see also S. 3217, § 3014(d)(1).
125. S. 186, § 3014(c); see also S. 3217, § 3014(c) (qualifying in greater detail what
an agent or attorney of the government may request).
126. The Act also prohibits prosecutors from considering advancement of attorney
fees by the corporation to the employee, the use of a joint defense agreement be-
tween employees and the corporation, sharing of information relevant to the investi-
gation with an employee, and failure to terminate or sanction an employee for
exercising the employee’s constitutional rights. See S. 186, 110th Cong.
§§ 3014(b)(2)(B)-(E); see also S. 3217, §§ 3014(b)(2)(A)-(B).
127. Compare S. 186, with S. 3217.
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adds important nuance to certain provisions.  In terms of similari-
ties, the Privilege Protection Acts of 2007 and 2008 share nearly
identical “Findings,” “Purpose,” and “Definitions” sections.128  Ad-
ditionally, the two Acts’ prohibitions on prosecutorial conduct and
allowance for voluntary waivers remain largely identical, although
at times the 2008 Act implements a more detailed and expanded
structure.129  Specifically, while the 2008 Act’s prohibitions remain
identical in their substance, the 2008 Act divides the provision
prohibiting prosecutors from demanding waivers of the attorney-
client privilege and conditioning treatment on such waivers into
three sections.130  The three sections in the 2008 Act state that a
government attorney or agent shall not “(A) demand or request . . .
(B) offer to reward or actually reward an organization . . . for waiv-
ing . . . the attorney client privilege or the attorney work product
doctrine; or (C) threaten adverse treatment or penalize an organi-
zation . . . for declining to waive . . . the attorney-client privilege
and work product protections.”131  Thus, despite the stylistic differ-
ences, the 2008 Act presents the same prohibitions as the 2007 Act,
but with greater specificity.  Similarly, the 2008 Act and 2007 Act
share the same substantive restrictions that direct government at-
torneys not to consider assertion of the privilege in either their
charging decision or evaluation of the corporation’s cooperation.132
But here again, the 2008 Act adds nuance through more detailed
language and expanded structure.133  Thus, despite slight stylistic
differences, the Privilege Protection Act’s core restrictions remain
relatively unchanged.
The differences between the 2007 and 2008 Acts largely result
from the 2008 Act’s more generous and detailed provisions to pro-
tect government attorneys or agents’ ability to request information
they “reasonably believe” not to be privileged.134  While the 2007
Act directs that “[n]othing in this act shall prohibit an agent or
attorney of the United States from requesting or seeking any com-
munication or material that such [attorney] reasonably believes is
not [privileged],” the 2008 Act allows government attorneys poten-
128. Compare S. 186, with S. 3217.
129. See, e.g., S. 3217, §§ 3014(b)(1)(A)-(C); S. 186, § 3014(b)(1).
130. S. 3217, §§ 3014(b)(1)(A)-(C).
131. Id.
132. See S. 3217, §§ 3014(b)(2)(A)-(B); S. 186, § 3014(b)(2).
133. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
134. Compare S. 186, § 3014(c), with S. 3217, §§ 3014(c)(1)-(3).
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tially greater flexibility in requesting information from corpora-
tions.135  The 2008 Act reads,
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a [govern-
ment attorney or agent] from requesting or seeking any commu-
nication or material that—(1) a [government attorney or agent]
of ordinary sense and understanding would not know is subject
to a [privilege] claim . . .; (2) a [government attorney or agent] of
ordinary sense and understanding would reasonably believe is
not entitled to protection under the attorney-client privilege or
attorney work-product doctrine; or (3) would not be privileged
from disclosure if demanded by subpoena duces tecum issues by
a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury
investigation.136
The third clause, in particular, presents a significant stylistic de-
parture from the 2007 Act; the clause likely aims to make clear that
the Act should not interfere with the government’s quest for fac-
tual information that would be responsive to a grand jury sub-
poena.137  The overall thrust of these provisions, however, remains
substantially similar to the corresponding section in the 2007 Act.
Additionally, the 2008 Act provides an essential alteration,
which clarifies that the Act restricts the government from consider-
ing in its charging decision a corporation’s waiver of the privi-
lege.138  An inconsistency exists in the 2007 Act’s two central
prohibitions on government conduct.  While one section 3014(b)(1)
directs government attorneys not to demand, request or condition
treatment on the waiver of the privilege, section 3014(b)(2) directs
the government not to condition charging decisions on the “valid
assertion” of the attorney client privilege, and leaves out any ex-
plicit prohibition on the government favorably considering waiver
of the privilege in its charging decision.139  Although the former
section 3014(b)(1) may be sufficiently broad and the Act’s purpose
may be clear enough to read into section 3014(b)(2) a prohibition
on favorably considering waiver in a charging decision, the effect
this off-kilter statutory structure would have remains somewhat
unclear.140  The 2008 Act’s prohibitions mirror this structure for the
most part, but the 2008 Act adds a clause preventing the govern-
ment from favorably considering privilege waiver in its charging
135. Compare S. 186, § 3014(c), with S. 3217, §§ 3014(c)(1)-(3).
136. S. 3217, §§ 3014(c)(1)-(3).
137. See id. § 3014(c)(3).
138. Compare S. 186, § 3014(b)(2), with S. 3217, §§ 3014(b)(2), (d)(2).
139. See S. 186, §§ 3014(b)(1)-(2).
140. See id.
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decision to close the 2007 Act’s potential loophole.141 Specifically,
the 2008 Act requires that a government attorney or agent must
not consider that any corporation’s “voluntary disclosure” “had
been subject to a non-frivolous claim of attorney-client privilege or
work-product protection.”  In other words, the government should
not consider that the privilege once protected any material volun-
tarily submitted, and that submission of such material likely consti-
tutes a waiver of the privilege.  Thus, the 2008 Act corrects a
potential pitfall in the 2007 Act.142
Despite the noted differences between the Privilege Protection
Act’s 2007 and 2008 versions, the Acts remain substantially similar
in their ultimate restriction on government action.  The main func-
tion of the Act—to prevent the government from considering in
any way assertion or waiver of the privilege in its corporate charg-
ing policy—remains intact.  Thus, analysis of the 2007 Act still di-
rectly applies to the 2008 Act.  Along those lines, a number of
notable omissions in the Privilege Protection Act raise questions
about the Act’s potential effectiveness.  The Act fails to provide
any means or process to determine if prosecutors have in fact re-
quested, demanded, or conditioned treatment on a waiver of the
privilege and work-product protections.143  Moreover, the Act
omits any sanction should prosecutors request information “rea-
sonably believed” to fall within privilege protections.144  Thus, al-
though the Act takes decisive action to prohibit prosecutors from
directly compelling waiver, it leaves out any repercussion should
the practice of requesting waivers continue.  This omission might
stem from the ethical duty of prosecutors to comply with the law
141. See S. 3217, §§ 3014(b)(1)-(2), (d)(1)-(2).
142. Notably, the 2008 Act includes a series of caveats that prevents the Act from
interfering with existing federal statutes authorizing any of the conduct the Act pro-
hibits or allowing the government to consider conduct the Act requires the govern-
ment to ignore. See S. 3217, §§ 3014(e)-(f).
143. See Posting of Peter J. Henning to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://law-
professors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/privileges/index.html (Dec. 9, 2006).
144. See The McNulty Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 44 (2007) [hereinafter H. Judi-
ciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007] (testimony of William Sullivan, Partner, Win-
ston & Strawn, Former Assistant United States Attorney, District of Columbia)
(“While the idea encompassed by the bill is sound, it lacks an enforcement mechanism
to ensure meaningful prosecutorial restraint, and I encourage the consideration of a
sanctions provision to deter the willful government violator.”); see infra Part II.B.2 for
a discussion of the Privilege Protection Act’s lack of a sanction; see infra Part II.A.1.c
for a discussion of the potential for increased prosecutorial liability and litigation that
the Act might engender.
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and “do justice,”145 but the lack of a sanction remains troubling to
some.  Additionally, whether the allowance for voluntary waivers
will swallow the prohibition to protect against compelled waivers is
a pressing concern.
As the Senate Judiciary Committee awaited Deputy Attorney
General Filip’s detailed proposal for revising the DOJ’s corporate
charging principles, Senator Specter and others continued to advo-
cate for the Privilege Protection Act’s passage into law.146  Senator
Specter, in his response to the Deputy Attorney General, re-
marked that:
[i]n the context of these lengthy delays and the potential
prejudice which is involved in these matters, I think it is too
much to ask for the legislative process to await a written revision
of McNulty and then await a review of the implementation of a
new memorandum for a reasonable “amount of time” which
could be very long.147
Thus, there remains a strong prospect that legislative action may
preempt a DOJ revision.  Despite testimony in favor of and against
the Act before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Security, the House passed its nearly identi-
cal version of the Privilege Protection Act on November 13,
2007.148  The Senate Judiciary Committee heard similarly conflicted
145. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 614 (1999) (“Prosecutors and others have also invoked this concept
[‘the duty to ‘seek justice’] to suggest why prosecutors should be trusted more than
other lawyers, why their conduct should be scrutinized less closely, or why they can be
counted on to act disinterestedly.”); see also ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
(1992) (“Standard 3-1.2 The Function of a Prosecutor . . . (c) the duty of the prosecu-
tor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”).
146. See Letter from Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, to Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y. Gen. (July 10, 2008) (“My recommendation to
Chairman Leahy is that we move ahead in the Judiciary Committee to either come to
some accommodation with the Administration on legislation or have Congress move
ahead on its own.”) (on file with author); Letter from Thirty-Three Former U.S.
Att’ys to Patrick Leahy, Chair, U.S. Senate. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 20, 2008)
(“As former representatives of the Department of Justice, we respectfully request
your support of S.186, the Attorney Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007.”), availa-
ble at http://www.acc.com/resource/v9833; see also Lynnley Browning, Bill to Protect
Companies in Inquiries Adds Support, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at C1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/business/23law.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=susan+
hackett&st=nyt&oref=slogin; Posting of Dan Slater to Wall St. J. Law Blog, http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/06/23/former-dojers-urge-congress-to-shore-up-attorney-
client-privilege (Jun. 23, 2008, 9:19 am EST).
147. See Letter from Arlen Specter to Mark Filip, supra note 146. R
148. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th Cong.
(2007).
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testimony over the potential ramifications of enacting the Privilege
Protection Act, but support has only widened for the Privilege Pro-
tection Act in the interim.149  Going forward, Congress likely will
have to scrutinize the Privilege Protection Act’s measures, and
continue to weigh the Act’s potential effectiveness against the Re-
vised DOJ Guidelines.  The following section of this Note explores
the testimony for and against the Privilege Protection Act, and ad-
dresses differing views on the Act’s potential effect on white-collar
prosecutions.
II. EVALUATING WHITE-COLLAR INVESTIGATIONS UNDER THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROTECTION ACT:
WHAT MIGHT SPECTER’S BILL ACCOMPLISH?
This Part will address conflicting views of how the Privilege Pro-
tection Act (“Privilege Protection Act”) might alter corporate
prosecutions.  Specifically, Part II addresses the multiple view-
points on two fundamental issues: how the Privilege Protection Act
will affect white-collar investigations, and whether the Act will bol-
ster the attorney-client privilege and work-product protections.
Some view the Act as a needless legislative restriction on
prosecutorial discretion that will decrease the efficacy of investiga-
tions and leave the current condition of privilege unimproved.150
In contrast, others view the Privilege Protection Act as a necessary
measure to balance coercive corporate investigations and prevent
the continued erosion of privilege under the DOJ’s corporate
charging policies.151  Part II relies largely on statements before the
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
House Committee on the Judiciary as well as statements before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding the pending Act and
the former prosecutorial practices under the McNulty Memo. De-
spite its focus on disclosing the facts of the corporate misconduct,
the Revised Guidelines likely will perpetuate privilege waiver prac-
149. The addition of eleven Senate members as co-sponsors also indicates the
widening support for the Privilege Protection Act. See supra note 26 and accompany- R
ing text.
150. See, e.g., Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client
Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007]
(statement of Karin Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon).
151. See, e.g., H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 45, R
53 (statement of Karen Mathis, Former President, American Bar Assocation) (be-
cause companies will continue to feel extreme pressure to waive in virtually every
case, the “culture of wavier” created by the Thompson Memorandum will continue
under the McNulty Memorandum).
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tices, and thus arguments regarding privilege waiver under the Mc-
Nulty Memo remain pertinent to today’s Guidelines.
A. How the Privilege Protection Act Might Affect the Logistics
of White-Collar Investigations
1. The Argument Against the Act’s Implementation
a. The Privilege Protection Act May Increase Inefficiency in
White-Collar Prosecutions
Some current and former prosecutors criticize the Privilege Pro-
tection Act for the undue burden it might place on investigating
complex, white-collar conspiracies.  By their nature, such crimes
are difficult to uncover, and possibly even harder to prove in court.
Obtaining a waiver, and thus the fruits of an internal investigation,
“can streamline a[ ] [governmental] investigation.”152  Under the
McNulty Memo, prosecutors could request a waiver upon showing
a “legitimate need,” but under the Privilege Protection Act, prose-
cutors could not request or consider privilege waiver in their inves-
tigation and charging decisions regarding a corporation.153  While
the Revised DOJ Guidelines prohibit prosecutors from requesting
waivers, the Guidelines do not prohibit prosecutors from consider-
ing waiver in their charging decisions.  Moreover, the Guidelines’
focus on factual disclosure as the benchmark of cooperation likely
entails waiver of the privilege in many cases.154  Although prosecu-
tors still must fulfill their duty of verifying the facts received from a
corporate investigation,155 DOJ officials insist that a waiver can be
crucial to the effectiveness of an investigation.  Specifically, Karin
Immergut, U.S. Attorney of the District of Oregon and the Chair
of the White-Collar Subcommittee for the Attorney General’s Ad-
visory Committee of the DOJ, submitted in her written testimony
to the Senate Judiciary Committee:
152. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of Karin R
Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon).
153. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong.
§§ 3014(b)(1)-(2) (2008); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186,
110th Cong. §§ 3014(b)(1)-(2) (2007).
154. See REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30; see also supra Part I.C.3
155. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 3 (statement of R
Karin Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon) (“Waiver of privilege is
not requested because the Department seeks to shift its investigatory burden onto
companies. Rather, federal prosecutors have an independent obligation to investigate
every case and, even if prosecutors are given the results of the corporation’s internal
investigation, they have to verify those facts. Waiver can streamline an investigation,
but prosecutors cannot, and do not, simply rely on waiver to prove their case.”).
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In these types of cases, replicating a lengthy and expensive in-
vestigation that has already been performed by a cooperating
company would burden taxpayers and do significant harm to the
interests of the victims of a corporate fraud. In a survey of
United States Attorneys’ Offices, federal prosecutors have told
us that waiver of privilege has expedited prosecution, avoided
the necessity for extensive pre-trial litigation, resulted in the
production of critical evidence that undermined the credibility
of the targets of an investigation, proved a target’s defenses
were not viable, and, in certain cases, allowed the government to
conclude an investigation quickly without bringing charges.
Waiver allows the government to act quickly and effectively—a
goal that should be encouraged, not thwarted.156
In her testimony, U.S. Attorney Karin Immergut claimed that
the Privilege Protection Act would sacrifice these efficiencies and
make it “far more difficult to bring corrupt organizations and their
executives to justice.”157  As she viewed it, the McNulty Memo had
reached “the proper balance between the protection of the attor-
ney-client privilege and the legitimate need of law enforcement to
prosecute corporate misconduct.”158  Thus, the Privilege Protection
Act could frustrate an investigation.
In addition to the potential ineffectiveness of investigations with-
out privilege waiver, an extended investigation combined with a
reported lack of resources in U.S. Attorney’s offices might deter
prosecutors from prosecuting white-collar crime.159  Prosecutors
are bound by an ethical duty to achieve just outcomes,160 yet the
limits of manpower and under-funding might seriously hamper
156. Id.
157. Id.  In his written testimony submitted to the House Judiciary Subcommittee
Hearing, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Barry M. Sabin argued that efficiency
and speed are not only in the prosecutor’s interests, but also in the corporation’s in-
terest. H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 16  (“[I]n R
our discussions with corporate counsel, they have acknowledged the benefits of pro-
ceeding quickly.  Rather than facing additional delay while the government duplicates
its efforts, the company will often offer the results of its internal investigation so that
the government’s investigation can move faster.  This allows the government to make
a charging decision within months, rather than years, which saves the company money
and employee time and protects the value of its stock.”).
158. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of Karin R
Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon).
159. See S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of R
Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School).
160. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573,
1578 (2003) (noting the “distinctive disciplinary rule for prosecutors” to “see that jus-
tice is done”).
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prosecutors’ ability to administer justice.161  Thus, as Columbia
Law School Professor Daniel Richman argued to the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, if Congress passes the Privilege Protection Act, it
is likely that an increase in funding for U.S. Attorney’s Offices
should accompany the bill, particularly considering potential in-
creases in expenditures during investigations.162  If the Privilege
Protection Act were to relax prosecutorial scrutiny on corporate
fraud, then the Act might achieve its goal of protecting the privi-
lege but only at the expense of effective and just prosecution.
b. The Privilege Protection Act May Decrease a Corporation’s
Willingness to Cooperate with the Government and Minimize
the Deterrent Effect of White-Collar Prosecutions
The Privilege Protection Act may provide a disincentive for cor-
porations to cooperate in white-collar investigations.163  In accor-
dance with the Revised DOJ Guidelines, a corporation may take
advantage of the ability to gain cooperation points for disclosing
the relevant facts of the suspected misconduct, and thereby avoid
criminal sanction.164  As the Privilege Protection Act would modify
it, corporations may still voluntarily waive their privilege, but will
no longer receive cooperation credit for privilege waivers.165  As
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Barry Sabin submitted to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, “[i]t would not make sense for the
161. See S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 2 (statement R
of Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School) (“Even as the Justice Depart-
ment has trumpeted its commitment to enforcement in this area, there have been
regular reports of under funding and open slots in U.S. Attorney’s offices, and of the
toll that counterterrorism, violent crime, and immigration programs have taken on
white collar [sic] enforcement generally.”).
162. See id. (“[S]uch a commitment of resources [to U.S. Attorney Offices] ought to
occur immediately.  It would be regrettable indeed if we simply waited until the next
spate of headlines about corporate fraud and then played catch-up.  And even worse,
if we waited until the next Enron, and then just created a few more federal crimes or
hiked up the sentences of those who do get prosecuted and convicted.”).
163. See H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 20 R
(statement of Barry M. Sabin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice); see also S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note
150 (statement of Karin Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon) (not- R
ing that the Bill would also prohibit the government from conferring any benefit on
individuals who have retained counsel and have decided to waive their privilege in an
attempt to cooperate with the government).
164. See REVISED DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 30.
165. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong.
§§ 3014(b)(1)-(3), (d)(1)-(2) (2008); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007,
S. 186, 110th Cong. §§ 3014(b)(1)-(2), (d) (2007); see also supra notes 138-142 and R
accompanying text.
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corporation to voluntarily provide information to the government
and not receive some credit for it.  There would be no incentive to
cooperation if that were the case.”166  Thus, some argue that the
government will likely have to engage in lengthier investigations
without a waiver, and in addition, will have less leverage to compel
the corporation to cooperate in the investigation.167  Undermining
some of the tools for white-collar investigations will lead to less
aggressive prosecution, and in turn, lessen the deterrent effect of
such investigations.168  As a result of less effective prosecution, cor-
porations are better able to conceal corporate fraud.  DOJ officials
believe that any increases in corporate fraud will endanger inves-
tors and the integrity of the market.169
c. The Privilege Protection Act May Chill Communications
Between Prosecutors and Defense Counsels, and Open the
Door to Prosecutorial Liability
Detractors also claim that the Privilege Protection Act may
greatly expand prosecutorial liability for certain conduct during a
white-collar investigation.  The Privilege Protection Act forbids
government attorneys from demanding, requesting, or conditioning
treatment on the disclosure of any privileged communication or
166. H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 4 (statement R
of Barry M. Sabin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department
of Justice).
167. See id. at 23 (“Taking away the Department’s ability to request a waiver and
our ability to make the right charging decisions by severely restricting what we can
consider in determining whether a corporation is cooperating, not only hamstrings
federal prosecutors, it will ultimately discourage corporate self-policing.”).
168. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 3 (statement of R
Michael Siegel, Professor, University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of Law)
(“With corporate cooperation, the successful completion of a complex white collar
[sic] prosecution, including resolution of corporate as well as all individual charges,
can very well be reduced from a matter of years to a matter of months.  This huge
efficiency gain represents a significant public good.  Far more white-collar criminal
behavior can be attacked with the same amount of resources devoted to the effort.
The efficiency argument is equally strong even when prosecutors erroneously target
an innocent company.  The fastest way a company can convince government agents of
its innocence is to share all pertinent information with them so that they can draw this
conclusion themselves.”).
169. See H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 23 R
(statement of Barry M. Sabin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice); S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at
9 (statement of Karin Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon) (“If
history is our guide, in the next decade, the impact of this legislation will fall on
American retirees and pension holders.  We should not turn back the clock.  Having
learned the lesson of Enron all too well, we need to maintain our vigilance so that it
does not happen again.”).
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work-product.170  This provision provides the essential restraint on
prosecutorial conduct to achieve the Act’s stated purpose of pre-
serving attorney-client privilege, because it supposedly forecloses
the potential for compelled waiver.  At the same time, this provi-
sion might lead to “considerable and extraordinary pre-trial litiga-
tion, with regular claims that the government’s decision to charge
was illegally influenced by the defendant corporation’s refusal to
waive its privilege.”171  In certain circumstances, corporate counsel
might even claim that the charges against “an individual defendant
were supported by privileged materials that the government ille-
gally obtained through an illegal threat to prosecute.”172  Prosecu-
tors will not be held liable if courts hold that the Privilege
Protection Act does not provide a legal remedy for such
prosecutorial conduct or that the defendant lacks standing to make
that claim; however, prosecutors will still have to battle this type of
litigation—wasting time and resources—in the midst of their inves-
tigation into an already complex conspiracy.173  Moreover, if this
type of litigation were successful, then “each claim of abuse could
offer defense counsel the opportunity to put a prosecutor or two on
the stand to testify about the charging decision.”174  By initiating
such an action, a defense counsel could gain valuable insight into
the government’s case.  Also, the potential for “an intrusive inquiry
into prosecutorial motivation might itself lead prosecutors to shy
away from a worthy case.”175
Another section of the Privilege Protection Act may extend
prosecutorial liability, and thus further deter white-collar prosecu-
tions.  The Privilege Protection Act carves out an exception to its
prohibition on requesting privileged material that permits “an
agent or attorney of the United States” to request “any communi-
cation or material that such agent or attorney reasonably believes
is not entitled to protection under the attorney-client privilege or
170. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong.
§ 3014(b)(1) (2008); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th
Cong. § 3014(b)(1) (2007).
171. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 100 (statement R
of Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 2 (“Maybe the individual defendant would be held to lack standing
to raise the . . . claim.   But this Committee needs to confront the cottage industry of
prosecutorial abuse claims that the proposed legislation would generate.”).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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attorney work-product doctrine.”176  The simultaneous prohibition
on requesting privileged material and exception for information
“reasonably believed” to fall outside such protections illustrates
the nuances prosecutors must contemplate when they request in-
formation from a defense counsel.177  Essentially, the Act requires
that prosecutors have “reasonable belief” that the information falls
outside of the privilege.  This standard may frustrate communica-
tion between prosecutors and defense counsels.178  For instance,
when a prosecutor knows that defense counsel gained information
regarding the alleged conduct from an internal investigation, each
question a prosecutor asks of counsel may implicate, at least par-
tially, attorney-client protections.179  Thus, these provisions may
compromise prosecutorial communications, or even lead to litiga-
tion over certain statements to defense counsel in the course of an
investigation.180
d. A Legislative Solution Might Unduly Hamper
Prosecutorial Discretion
Since stepping down from government service, Paul McNulty
continues to defend the policy he established in his memo.181  Cit-
ing the low occurrence of formal Category II privilege waiver re-
176. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
§ 3014(c) (2007) (“(c) INAPPLICABILITY—Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an
agent or attorney of the United States from requesting or seeking any communication
or material that such an agent or attorney reasonably believes is not entitled to pro-
tection under the attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product doctrine.”); see
also Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. § 3014(c)
(2008) (adding three provisions to clarify what a government attorney or agent may
and may not request); supra note 136 and accompanying text. R
177. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 2 (statement of R
Karin Immergut, U.S. Attorney, District of Oregon) (“If this bill is passed, the follow-
ing simple questions by the SEC or the Department of Justice could be stymied if the
corporation retained counsel to look into the matter: How did you learn of the fraud?
What remedial actions did you take? Can you disclose what happened? . . . Whenever
questions must be answered with information obtained by counsel in the internal in-
vestigation, i.e., protected by attorney-client privilege or work product, [sic] the legis-
lation would prohibit asking these questions.”).
178. See id. (“[I]n most investigations, the prosecutor will be hesitant to take ad-
vantage of this section because of the potential for adverse rulings from a court if the
matter is later litigated and the court sets an unexpectedly high threshold for finding
‘reasonable belief’ that the materials are not entitled to protection.”).
179. See id. This will also likely decrease the efficiency of such investigations.
180. See id. (“The potential inability to broach vital topics with counsel prevents the
United States from making an assessment of whether opposing counsel’s assertion of
privilege is even valid.”).
181. Paul J. McNulty, Partner, Baker & McKenzie, & Former Deputy Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the American Bar Association’s National Institute on
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quests (four over a period of ten months during the Memo’s
implementation), McNulty argued at an ABA Securities Confer-
ence that “[t]he Department should police itself rather than the
legislative branch telling the executive branch how it should con-
duct its investigations.”182  In McNulty’s view, the low number of
requested Category II privilege waivers suggested that the memo
had worked to restrain prosecutors from pressuring corporate
counsel to waive the privilege.183  With the implementation of the
Revised DOJ Guidelines, an argument exists for allowing the DOJ
to proceed under its new policy before deciding that a legislative
intervention remains necessary.  Deputy Attorney General Mark
Filip asked for that much in his letter to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee prior to the implementation of the Revised DOJ Guide-
lines.184  Moreover, DOJ guidance documents may be amended
more easily and quickly to the needs of law enforcement than
legislation.
Securities Fraud (Oct. 25, 2007) [hereinafter McNulty Speech at the ABA] (transcript
available in 21 CORP. CRIM. REPORTER 43, 4 (2007) (print edition only)).
182. Id.
183. Earlier in his speech McNulty acknowledged that there “have been dozens of
voluntary waivers in the past ten months,” but counters that these voluntary waivers
would likely continue under the Privilege Protection Act, since they “are often advan-
tageous to the corporation,” and “[the act] specifically provides that voluntary waiv-
ers will continue to occur.” Id.  Notably, McNulty does not address the frequency
with which corporations waive Category I information over that period, or how often
the Department has considered a privilege waiver in determining sufficient coopera-
tion to avoid prosecution. Id.  See Part II.B.2. infra for a discussion of the Privilege
Protection’s Act possible effect on preserving attorney-client privilege.  While Mc-
Nulty acknowledged that he had heard stories of prosecutors requesting waivers in
defiance of the McNulty Memo’s procedures, he believed this problem was an inter-
nal “prosecutorial compliance issue.”  This is a challenge inherent in having ninety-
three independent U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and a practice, McNulty believes, that
may be curbed with further training and oversight. See McNulty Speech at the ABA,
supra note 181 (“And then a lawyer will say to me—that’s all well and good Paul, but R
last week, I was in a meeting, and before the air was out of the cushion of my chair
when I sat down, the government hit me with a demand for a waiver.  If that hap-
pened, that would be an acute violation of the Department’s policy.  And there we
have a prosecutorial compliance issue.  The fact that we have [ninety-three] different
offices is a challenge that you can’t just overcome.  You have to hope that there is
some standard that tries to pull things together.  We are better off with a kind of
structure or regime.  Prosecutors are being trained in this process.  They are having to
follow these rules.”).
184. See Letter from Mark Filip to Patrick J Leahy and Arlen Specter, supra note
27 (“I respectfully ask that you give us an opportunity to implement these changes R
and then review their operation after a reasonable amount of time before pursuing
legislation in this area.”).
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2. The Argument for the Act’s Implementation
a. The Government May Conduct Effective White-Collar
Investigations Without the Aid of Privilege Waiver
Supporters of the Privilege Protection Act argue that the govern-
ment has and may continue to conduct effective white-collar inves-
tigations without a corporation waiving its privilege.  Many former
prosecutors, including former Attorneys General, submitted testi-
mony to Congress and letters to the Department of Justice expres-
sing the conviction from their experience: a waiver is not essential
to white-collar prosecutions.185  Federal prosecutors have numer-
ous tools at their disposal to conduct investigations without relying
on waivers to receive information.  For instance, the government
might utilize the power of the grand jury to issue subpoenas, obtain
warrants for the search and seizure of evidence, conduct govern-
ment proffers, and engage in cooperation deals with co-defend-
ants.186  If Congress passed the Privilege Protection Act, federal
prosecutors would still have ready use of these tools; the Act would
simply prohibit them from requesting or conditioning treatment on
privilege waiver.187  Where a corporation should see fit, however,
under the Act it may always waive its privilege in its efforts to co-
185. See, e.g., S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 110 R
(statement of Dick Thornburgh, Former Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice); see
also Letter from Former Senior Dep’t of Justice Officials to Alberto Gonzalez, Att’y
Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Letter From Former Senior Dep’t of
Justice Officials], available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/
065/065.pdf.
186. See White-Collar Enforcement:  Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waiv-
ers, Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., at 50 (2006) [herein-
after H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 7, 2006] (testimony of William Sullivan,
Partner, Winston & Strawn, & Former Assisant United States Attorney, District of
Columbia) (“Mr. Chabot (R-OH):  What alternative techniques are available to pros-
ecutors to obtain the needed information from a corporation without requiring a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege?  Mr. Sullivan:  There are all types of investiga-
tive techniques.  There is cooperation undertaken by individuals within the corpora-
tion.  There is the grand jury process, with subpoenas.  There are wires . . . .”).
187. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of Dick R
Thornburgh, Former Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (“As you know, for a
large part of my professional career I either served as a federal prosecutor myself or
supervised other federal prosecutors. S. 186 does not in any way impair federal prose-
cutors from doing their proper jobs.  They would remain free to prosecute—or refrain
from prosecuting—as warranted by the evidence and the law.  In support of such
determinations, they could seek any communication or material they reasonably be-
lieve is not privileged, and they could accept voluntary submissions by companies of
the results of internal investigations.  They could also continue to seek other informa-
tion through Grand Jury subpoenas, immunity agreements, and all the other tools that
prosecutors have historically used.  They simply could not seek, directly or indirectly,
waivers of privileged information.”).
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operate.188  While the sharing of an internal investigation report
and the waiver of privilege it likely entails would speed-up an in-
vestigation, prosecutors still have a duty to investigate the charges
included in and beyond the reports of corporate counsel.189  Thus,
the time and resources devoted to investigations may remain com-
parable.  Moreover, as explored further in the next section, prose-
cutors may obtain significant amounts of information regarding
potential illegal conduct through interactions with corporate coun-
sel that do not constitute privilege wavier.
b. A Corporation May Sufficiently Cooperate Without Waiving
Its Privilege
Both supporters and opponents of the Act agree that sufficient
cooperation may be achieved without a waiver of privileged mate-
rial.  Under the Privilege Protection Act, corporations may waive
their attorney-client privilege to cooperate with the government,
but at the same time, the Act prohibits the government from con-
sidering such a wavier in evaluating the corporation’s coopera-
tion.190  Nonetheless, supporters of the Act argue that it leaves
enough avenues of cooperation open so that a corporation may
both expedite an investigation and receive cooperation credit for
its action.  As Andrew Weissmann, former Assistant United States
Attorney and Director of the Department of Justice’s Enron Task
Force, submitted to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, without waiving its attorney-
client privilege “a company can give the government documents
that will further its investigation and steer investigators to company
employees with critical information.  It can also give the govern-
ment an attorney proffer of salient information.  None of that re-
quires the company to waive the attorney-client privilege.”191  As
188. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong.
§ 3014(d) (2008); Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th
Cong. § 3014(d) (2007).
189. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150, at 3 (statement of R
Karin Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon) (“Waiver of privilege is
not requested because the Department seeks to shift its investigatory burden onto
companies. Rather, federal prosecutors have an independent obligation to investigate
every case and, even if prosecutors are given the results of the corporation’s internal
investigation, they have to verify those facts. Waiver can streamline an investigation,
but prosecutors cannot, and do not, simply rely on waiver to prove their case.”).
190. See S. 3217, §§ 3014(d), (b); S. 186, §§ 3014(d), (b).
191. See H. Judiciary Subcom. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 50 (written R
statement of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, & Former Assistant
United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, and Director of the Depart-
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others argue, corporate counsel may assist the government to un-
derstand these disclosed items, and even share some of the “results
of internal investigations in ways that do not implicate privileged
material.”192  These traditional forms of cooperation might allow
corporations to provide a factual roadmap of the illegal conduct to
prosecutors without having to divulge privileged employee inter-
views and related legal analysis.193  Thus, supporters of the Privi-
lege Protection Act argue that a corporation, if it so desires, will
likely be able to cooperate with the government in white-collar in-
vestigations, without impacting its attorney-client privilege and
work-product protections.
c. The Privilege Protection Act Is Consonant with Other
Legislative Restraints on Prosecutorial Conduct
Supporters of the Privilege Protection Act argue that a legisla-
tive restriction on prosecutorial action remains a properly tailored
solution to protect the privilege.  Previous legislative acts have im-
plemented restrictions on prosecutorial conduct, and the Act at
hand is no different.194  Notably, the McDade-Murtha Act (requir-
ing federal prosecutors to abide by state ethics rules), the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
limit how a prosecutor may investigate and prosecute a case.195
Under the Privilege Protection Act, prosecutors retain their discre-
tion to determine whether to charge and what charges to lodge
against a corporation.  The Act “merely restricts the ability to exact
ment of Justice’s Enron Task Force); but see Broun & Capra, supra note 57, at 232 R
(stating that certain courts may not uphold certain confidentiality agreements).
192. Letter from Former Senior Dep’t of Justice Officials, supra note 185. R
193. See H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 7, 2006, supra note 186, at 50-51 R
(testimony of William M. Sullivan, Winston & Strawn, & Former Assistant United
States Attorney, District of Columbia) (“[W]e will assist the Government to the ex-
tent that it is in our best interests to provide them with the roadmap, with the factual
outline, who you should talk to, what this document means.  But we shouldn’t have to
and we don’t want to provide them with our mental impressions, our specific inter-
view notes, our opinion work-product, and our sensitive discussions with employees
because we want to preserve the ability to talk to them again about another problem
so that we can continue to observe the law.”).
194. See S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (written state- R
ment of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, & Former Assistant United
States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, and Director of the Department of
Justice’s Enron Task Force) (“The Senate bill would not be unprecedented or oner-
ous.  Federal prosecutors have numerous strictures on their conduct imposed by stat-
ute and rules, from the McDade bill requiring them to adhere to state ethics rules in
conducting investigations, to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal
Rules of Evidence, which limit how they can investigate and prosecute a case.”).
195. See id.
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waivers of a sacrosanct privilege as a sign of a company’s bona
fides that it is cooperating with law enforcement.”196 It does not,
therefore, unduly impinge on prosecutorial discretion.
B. How the Privilege Protection Act Will Affect Waivers in
White-Collar Investigations
1. Supporters of the Privilege Protection Act Claim that the Act
Will Bolster the Privilege and Remedy the “Culture of Waiver”
that Pervades White-Collar Investigations
The Privilege Protection Act has garnered support from the
American Bar Association, local Bar organizations, the Associa-
tion of Corporate Counsels, and a wide-ranging group of legal or-
ganizations that formed “The Coalition to Protect the Attorney-
Client Privilege.”197  These organizations lobbied Senator Specter
to introduce the Privilege Protection Act, and they have endorsed
the Act because they believed it would end the practice of coerced
waiver under the McNulty Memo.198  Although the McNulty
Memo implemented stricter controls on privilege waiver requests,
196. Id.
197. Press Release, Karen J. Mathis, Former President, ABA, Regarding the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 (Dec. 7, 2006) (“The Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2006 . . . is critically important to our nation’s economic
and legal health, and warrants prompt approval by Congress.”) (on file with author);
see H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 77-87 (written R
statement of Richard T. White, Chairman, Board of Directors of the Association of
Corporate Counsel) (supporting legislation and criticizing the McNulty Memo); id. at
88 (Attachment 1:  Why Congress Should Act to Protect the Attorney Client Privi-
lege, Offered by the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege) (The Coali-
tion “strongly supports S. 186, the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007”).
The following member organizations comprise “The Coalition to Protect the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege”:  American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union,
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Round-
table, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Association of
Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
198. Letter from Karen J. Mathis, Former President, ABA, to Patrick J. Leahy,
Chair, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/073/073.pdf; see also H. Judiciary
Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 59 (written statement of Karen R
J. Mathis, Former President, American Bar Association) (“Because the McNulty
Memorandum fails to solve the problem of government coerced waiver, the ABA
urges members of the subcommittee to introduce or support legislation, like S.186,
that would: (1) prohibit federal prosecutors from demanding, requesting, or encourag-
ing, directly or indirectly, that companies waive their attorney-client or work-product
protections during investigations; (2) specify the types of factual, non-privileged infor-
mation that prosecutors may request from companies during investigations as a sign
of cooperation; and (3) clarify that any voluntary decision by a company to waive the
attorney-client privilege and the work sproduct doctrine shall not be considered when
assessing whether the entity provided effective cooperation.”).
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its focus on waiver as a factor of cooperation continued to pressure
companies to waive their privilege.199  Supporters of the Act ar-
gued that there was an immediate need to end this practice, and
that the Privilege Protection Act was the proper vehicle to achieve
these means.200   Even after the McNulty Memo’s demise, initial
responses to the Revised DOJ Guidelines indicate that the Privi-
lege Protection Act’s strongest supporters still argue for the Act’s
necessity, because the Guidelines “leave many problems un-
resolved.”201  Supporters, thus, argue that the Act would apply
across the federal government and reverse the “culture of waiver”
by eliminating any consideration of privilege waiver in corporate
charging decisions.202  Moreover, the Act still would provide suffi-
cient means to cooperate in allowing voluntary waiver and focusing
on the exchange of non-privileged information.
Additionally, supporters of the Privilege Protection Act point
out that an uncertain privilege “actually diminishes compliance
with the law,” since it would deter employees from consulting with
in-house counsel out of fear that their statements will be disclosed
to the government.203  As a result, corporations likely will have a
199. See S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (written state- R
ment of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, Former Assistant United
States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, and Director of the Department of
Justice’s Enron Task Force) (“Yet another problem under the McNulty Memoran-
dum–which the Senate bill would remedy–is that companies will continue to feel un-
due pressure to waive the privilege because the memorandum still permits a
prosecutor to consider a company’s refusal to waive in various circumstances and also
still gives ‘credit’ to those companies for waiver.”).
200. See id. (statement of Dick Thornburgh, Former Att’y Gen., U.S. Department
of Justice) (“Congress should enact legislation such as S. 186 promptly to restore the
attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine and the Constitutional rights of
individuals to their proper places in our system of justice.”).
201. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, supra note 31; Press Release, R
H. Thomas Wells, Jr., supra note 17. R
202. See House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at R
90 (Attachment 1:  Why Congress Should Act to Protect the Attorney Client Privi-
lege, Offered by the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege) (advocating
that “S.186 prevents both direct coercion (e.g., demanding or requesting [disclosure of
privileged information]) and indirect coercion (e.g., measuring cooperation or other-
wise conditioning treatment on such an action)”).
203. The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 21 (2007)
[hereinafter S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 12, 2007] (statement of Thomas J. Don-
ohue, President & Chief Execuctive Officer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (“If com-
pany employees responsible for compliance with complicated statutes and regulations
know that their conversations with attorneys are not protected, many will simply
choose not to talk to their attorneys.  The result is that the company may fall out of
compliance—not intentionally—but because of a lack of communication and trust be-
tween the company’s employees and its attorneys.”); see also Upjohn Co. v. United
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difficult time running effective compliance programs; therefore in-
creasing the likelihood of fraud.  The Privilege Protection Act rec-
ognizes the usefulness of compliance programs in serving as a
preventative measure against corporate fraud, and seeks to reinvig-
orate such programs through a secured privilege.204  Also, limiting
waivers of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protec-
tions would reduce third-party liability due to corporate miscon-
duct, and the “massive settlements” that usually accompany such
cases.205  Thus, the former President of the ABA, Karen Mathis,
has hailed the Privilege Protection Act as “strik[ing] the proper
balance between the legitimate needs of prosecutors and regulators
and the constitutional and fundamental legal rights of individuals
and organizations.”206
2. Detractors Argue that the Privilege Protection Act Will not
Prevent Privilege Waivers from Serving as a Mainstay of
White-Collar Investigations
Detractors argue that the Privilege Protection Act will fail to
achieve its main objective.  The attorney-client privilege would be
no more protected under the Act than under the current regime.
The risk of a corporate indictment in white-collar investigation re-
mains so great that corporations likely will remain compelled to
States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (noting the importance of the privilege to protect
compliance programs).
204. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
§§ 2(a)(2), (4) (2007) (“(2) Protecting attorney-client privileged communications from
compelled disclosure fosters voluntary compliance with the law . . . (4) The ability of
an organization to have effective compliance programs . . . is enhanced when there is
clarity and consistency regarding the attorney-client privilege.”).  But note, if the
practice of voluntary waivers permitted by the Privilege Protection Act becomes
widespread, the privilege and work-product protections’ integrity would remain in
question. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong.
§§ 2(a)(2), (4) (2008).
205. See H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 17 R
(statement of Thomas J. Donohue, President & Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce) (“Once the privilege is waived, third-party private plaintiff lawyers
can gain access to attorney-client conversations and use them to sue the company or
obtain massive settlements.”).
206. Press Release, Karen Mathis, Former President, ABA, Regarding the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 (Dec. 7, 2006).
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cooperate with the government.207  And, possibly the quickest and
most efficient form of cooperation involves privilege waiver.208
Although the Act would prohibit the government from request-
ing a privilege waiver, the pressure to waive the privilege likely will
remain in place for a variety of reasons.  First, as Paul McNulty
acknowledged in a speech before the ABA’s National Institute on
Securities Fraud, “[i]t doesn’t matter therefore, if prosecutors are
prohibited from ever asking or severely restricted from asking [for
privilege waiver]—as they are under my Memo . . . .  Companies
will continue to voluntarily waive, because they want to be cooper-
ative.”  Second, as McNulty pointed out, in cases of “extensive
wrongdoing,” “other forms of cooperation may not be sufficient to
overcome a strong possibility of indictment.”209  Third, corpora-
tions made aware of the possibility of indictment want to quickly
dissuade the government from pursuing such a path.  As Professor
Daniel Richman stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
“[t]he faster and more convincingly corporate counsel can either
assure enforcers of the limited nature and scope of any improprie-
ties or demonstrate that no improprieties occurred, the better for
the company. This dynamic would continue even after legislative
intervention . . . .”210  Thus, with these factors in mind, a corpora-
tion—though acting voluntarily under the Act—would still feel in-
clined to implement the most complete form of disclosure to the
government:  privilege waiver.
207. See McNulty Speech at the ABA, supra note 181 (“The reality is that compa- R
nies are going to cooperate out of principle, or because they are simply worried about
being indicted . . . They have a compelling story to tell that will necessitate disclosure.
I have seen this in just two months of private practice.  Whatever the reason, corpora-
tions will continue to waive the privilege because it is in their best interest to do so.”).
208. See id. (“It is hard to be cooperative without crossing the waiver line.”); see
also Part II.A.1.a.
209. McNulty Speech at the ABA, supra note 181 (“Supporters of the legislation to R
prohibit the government from seeking waivers seem to think that if the government is
not allowed to ask, the pressure to waive will go away.  The problem with that view is
that other forms of cooperation may not be sufficient to overcome a strong possibility
of indictment in cases involving extensive wrongdoing.  There is only so much you can
do to cooperate without providing information.”).
210. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of R
Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School) (“In a broad range of cases, legis-
lative intervention would change little.  Companies currently have very strong incen-
tives both to pursue internal investigations and to voluntarily offer up otherwise
privileged information obtained in the course of those investigations.  Where a federal
enforcer—prosecutor or agency official—has expressed an interest in a matter (or
there is a risk that such an interest will develop), corporate interests will frequently be
served by providing an oral report or handing over a written one, and perhaps disclos-
ing the underlying factual materials.”).
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Now a common practice in corporate investigations, voluntary
privilege waivers have long held a significant role in the American
criminal justice system.  Assuming that the government, through
aggressive white-collar prosecutions has fostered a “culture of
waiver,” Professor Richman points out that such a state
[h]ardly advances the argument for extraordinary legislative in-
tervention . . .  [t]he fact is that the entire federal criminal justice
system is based on a culture of waiver: most federal criminal
defendants plead guilty, and a very large percentage of them
waive their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and provide in-
formation and testimony against others in order to avoid har-
sher sentences.211
While individual defendants cooperating with the government in
exchange for leniency usually do not have to waive their attorney-
client privilege, “the distinction between individuals and corpora-
tions arises less from any governmental bias against capital forma-
tion than from the special relationship between corporate counsel
and corporate ‘knowledge.’”212  Thus, in some ways, the preva-
lence of deferred prosecution agreements, proffers, and other co-
operation deals favors a “culture of waiver,” apart from the DOJ
corporate charging policy.213
Finally, without the means to enforce its prohibition on request-
ing privilege waiver or conditioning treatment on such a waiver,
some criticize the Privilege Protection Act for “lack[ing] an en-
forcement mechanism to ensure meaningful prosecutorial re-
straint.”214  While the Privilege Protection Act forbids the
government from demanding, requesting, or conditioning treat-
ment on waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the Act fails to pro-
211. Id.
212. Id. (“When an individual seeks to cooperate with the government, he is ex-
pected to tell all he knows about the matters being investigated and many peripheral
matters (like unrelated personal misconduct), with grave consequences often attend-
ing his failure to be completely forthcoming. If one expects analogous disclosure from
artificial entities like corporations, there may be no one to turn to other than the
lawyers—the only corporate agents charged with gathering all the information within
the entity’s collective knowledge.”).
213. Here, supporters of the Act might point out that the legislation does not aim
to protect privilege waivers.  Rather, supporters would argue that forced privilege
waivers are the impetus for the Act.  A likely response to this argument is that sys-
temic features of the criminal justice system favoring plea agreements to a jury trial
compel corporations to cooperate, not the government strong-arming the corporation
to waive its privilege.
214. See H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 44 (testi- R
mony of William Sullivan, Partner, Winston & Strawn, Former Assistant United
States Attorney, District of Columbia).
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vide any penalty or remedy should the Government take such
action.215  This omission leaves the Act without teeth to enforce its
central provision.  Towards this end, William Sullivan, a former As-
sistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia, encouraged the
Senate Judiciary Committee to consider “a sanctions provision to
deter the willful government violator.”216  In light of these argu-
ments for and against the Privilege Protection Act, the next section
will discuss whether the Act merits Congressional approval.
III. THE POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROTECTION ACT WEIGH AGAINST
ITS PASSAGE INTO LAW
In light of the criticism discussed in Part II and the principles set
forth in Part I, Part III recommends a course of action for the Sen-
ate regarding the Privilege Protection Act.  Part III.A addresses
the factors that weigh against passing the Act.  Part III.B presents
an argument for a “wait and see” approach to evaluate how corpo-
rate prosecution will proceed under the Revised DOJ Guidelines.
Finally, Part III.C suggests that the Senate should not intervene at
this time, and should reconsider the doctrine of selective waiver.
A. Why the Senate Should not Pass the Privilege Protection
Act in Its Current Form
As it is currently drafted, the Privilege Protection Act is unlikely
to curb the practice of privilege and work-product protection waiv-
ers in white-collar investigations.  Essentially, the Privilege Protec-
tion Act aims to remove a corporation’s incentive to waive its
privilege.  Thus, the Act forbids prosecutors from considering the
waiver or assertion of the privilege and work-product protections
in their charging decisions.217  At the same time, the Act still per-
mits corporations to voluntarily waive their privilege and work-
product protections.218  Despite the Act’s prohibition of providing
215. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
§ 3014(b) (2007) (prohibiting the government from conditioning charging decisions or
evaluating a corporation’s cooperation on the assertion of the privilege); see also At-
torney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. §§ 3014(b), (d)(2)
(2008).
216. See H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing March 8, 2007, supra note 144, at 34 (testi- R
mony of William Sullivan, Partner, Winston & Strawn, Former Assistant United
States Attorney, District of Columbia).
217. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also S. 3217, § 3014(b)(2); S. R
186, § 3014(b)(2).
218. See S. 3217, § 3014(d); S. 186, § 3014(d).
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cooperation credit for a corporation’s waiver of the privilege and
work-product protections, the consequences of an indictment will
continue to pressure corporations to cooperate with the govern-
ment.219  Since privilege and work-product waivers remain one of
the most effective forms of cooperation, corporations will likely
continue to waive their rights as permitted by the Privilege Protec-
tion Act.220
Additionally, unlike those corporations who wish to cooperate
and will likely waive their privileges to do so, corporations dead-set
on evading corporate charges may rely on the Privilege Protection
Act to frustrate a government investigation.  To the extent that it
forbids prosecutors from considering the waiver or assertion of the
privilege and work-product protections, the Act lends greater lee-
way for corporations to engage in conduct that may shield criminal
conduct from the government.221
Although the Act would prohibit the government from request-
ing or conditioning any treatment on waiver or an assertion of the
privilege, most forms of cooperation likely lead to a waiver of the
privilege.222  Confidentiality is the key to the attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product protections.223  When a corporation dis-
closes to the government its communications from employees to
counsel or attorney-produced factual reports of misconduct, the at-
torney-client privilege and work-product protections are likely
waived as to the entire subject matter of those communications.224
While many experts have testified before the Senate that corpora-
tions may sufficiently cooperate without a wavier, most of the
means proposed likely would result in waiver of the privilege and
work-product protections.225  For instance, William Sullivan’s pro-
posal to the House Judiciary Subcommittee of producing a factual
roadmap would likely implicate the work-product doctrine and
possibly waive it for the subject matter of the disclosure.226  In fact,
Sullivan’s proposed cooperation method mirrors the Revised DOJ
219. See McNulty Speech at the ABA, supra note 181; supra notes 96-100 and ac- R
companying text; see also supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. R
220. See S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of R
Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School); McNulty Speech at the ABA,
supra note 181. R
221. See Posting of Peter J. Henning to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://law-
professors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/privileges/index.html (Dec. 9, 2006).
222. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.1. But see supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text. R
223. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. R
224. See id.; see generally supra Part I.B.
225. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
226. See supra note 193. R
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Guidelines’ emphasis on the corporation disclosing the facts rele-
vant to the misconduct obtained during an internal investigation,
which in many ways may also lead to a waiver of the privilge.  An-
drew Weissman’s testimony before the same Subcommittee, how-
ever, more closely approximates what corporate cooperation may
look like without a waiver.  Weissman suggests that a corporation
may hand over pertinent, non-privileged documents and direct the
government to the key employees involved in potential miscon-
duct.227  Yet, this level of cooperation may not sufficiently aid the
government’s case.  The government could obtain much of this in-
formation through the typical grand jury subpoena process it relies
on to investigate corporate wrongdoing.  Thus, under the Act, the
corporation would have to strike a precarious balance between co-
operating with the government and simultaneously preserving the
privilege and work-product protections.  Too much tilting in either
direction might lead to insufficient cooperation and thus a pending
indictment, or waiver of the privilege and work-product protec-
tions and an increased likelihood of third party liability.
While the Act aims to prevent government-compelled waivers, a
perverse result ensues if the Privilege Protection Act’s rubric is
stretched to its limit.  The Privilege Protection Act only allows the
government to consider the disclosure of non-privileged or non-
work-product protected material towards a charging decision.
Thus, Company A might obtain greater cooperation credit for not
having waived its privilege but still cooperating (for example, by
handing over non-privileged emails or documents) as compared to
Company B, who waived the privilege entirely (for example, by
handing over privileged communications and a factual roadmap of
the corporate misconduct) and whose cooperation largely consists
of privileged or work-product protected material.  Presumably,
corporate counsels would recognize this potential pitfall and en-
sure that any disclosure to the government contains sufficient non-
privileged material to gain cooperation credit.228  The House Re-
port to H.R. 3013 tries to protect against this absurd result by stat-
ing that “there should be no differentials in assessment of
cooperation (i.e., neither a credit nor a penalty) based upon
whether or not the materials disclosed are protected by the attor-
227. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. R
228. Additionally, the Act requires prosecutors to refrain from feeling obliged to
give the corporation waiving its privilege, such as Company B in the example above,
greater cooperation credit.
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ney-client privilege or attorney work-product.”229  But if all materi-
als are considered equally, it follows that the corporation with the
most helpful and sizeable voluntary disclosure would be considered
the ideal cooperator.  This type of disclosure often entails corpo-
rate counsel presenting the findings of the internal investigation to
the government, which likely entails waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.  Thus, in practice, the dangers of corporate indictment
provides a strong incentive to cooperate, and to do so at the ex-
pense of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.
Despite the Privilege Protection Act’s design, the consequences of
a criminal investigation likely will continue to compel corporations
to roll-over as quickly and effectively as possible through volunta-
rily waiving its privilege.230
Similarly, the notable omission of a sanction should a prosecutor
fail to adhere to the Act’s terms raises questions about the Act’s
potential effectiveness.  The Act fails to provide any means or
processes to determine if prosecutors have in fact, requested, de-
manded, or conditioned treatment on a waiver of the privilege and
work-product protections.231  Moreover, the Act omits any sanc-
tion should prosecutors fail to adhere to the prescribed conduct
involving waivers232 or requesting information “reasonably be-
lieved” to fall outside privilege protections.233  Thus, although the
Act takes decisive action to prohibit prosecutors from directly
compelling waiver, it leaves out any repercussions should the prac-
tice of requesting waivers continue.  Despite prosecutors’ ethical
duty to comply with the law and “do justice,”234 the lack of a sanc-
229. H.R. REP. NO. 110-445, at 4 (2007).
230. Here, the normative effects of a continued “culture of waiver” might continue
to push companies to match each other’s cooperation, particularly when it comes to
privilege and work-product protection waivers.
231. See Posting of Peter J. Henning to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://law-
professors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/privileges/index.html (Dec. 9, 2006).
232. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text. R
233. See Part II.B.2 supra for a discussion of the Privilege Protection Act’s lack of a
sanction; see also S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (state- R
ment of Karin Immergut, United States Attorney, District of Oregon) (“[I]n most
investigations, the prosecutor will be hesitant to take advantage of this section be-
cause of the potential for adverse rulings from a court if the matter is later litigated
and the court sets an unexpectedly high threshold for finding ’reasonable belief’ that
the materials are not entitled to protection.”).  Part II.A.1.c supra discusses the poten-
tial for increased prosecutorial liability and litigation that the Act might engender.
234. Green, supra note 145, at 614 (“Prosecutors and others have also invoked this R
concept [the duty to ‘seek justice’] to suggest why prosecutors should be trusted more
than other lawyers, why their conduct should be scrutinized less closely, or why they
can be counted on to act disinterestedly.”).
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tion remains troubling to some white-collar defense attorneys. The
inclusion of a sanctions provision, therefore, might increase confi-
dence in the Act’s ability to regulate prosecutors.  For instance, the
McDade-Murtha Bill (requiring prosecutors to follow State ethics
codes) included potential sanctions and an enforcement means in
its text.235
Concerns over chilled communications between defense coun-
sels and prosecutors as well as extraneous litigation involving
prosecutorial discretion remain the most serious threats presented
by the Privilege Protection Act’s passage.  Before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, Professor Daniel Richman directly addressed
these issues.236  Specifically, the Act’s prohibition of requesting or
“conditioning treatment” on waiver or assertion of the privilege
and work-product protections might lead to additional litigation,
where the corporate defendant claims that “the government’s deci-
sion to charge was illegally influenced by defendant corporation’s
refusal to waive its privilege.”237  Every such claim might lead to
the defendant corporation being able to place the prosecutor on
the witness stand, and thus, provide the defense with insight into
the government’s case.238  Such an “intrusive inquiry” could lead to
complex litigation involving prosecutorial discretion.  Defense
counsel could then use the provision as an offensive sword rather
than the shield Senator Specter might have intended for the Act to
provide.239  Courts, however, may find that the Act fails to provide
for any standing to assert these claims, but without further amend-
ment to the Act, these concerns remain open questions.
The Act provides another foothold for extraneous litigation in
already complex white-collar prosecutions.  Section 3014(c) per-
mits a prosecutor to request disclosure of information the prosecu-
tor “reasonably believes is not entitled to protection under the
attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product doctrine.”240  As
U.S. Attorney Karin Immergut pointed out to the Senate Judiciary
235. See Citizens Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3396, 105th Cong. (1998).




240. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
§ 3014(c) (2007) (“(c) INAPPLICABILITY—Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an
agent or attorney of the United States from requesting or seeking any communication
or material that such an agent or attorney reasonably believes is not entitled to pro-
tection under the attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product doctrine.”); see
also Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. § 3014(c)
(2008) (slightly revised).
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Committee, this provision would likely chill, or at least complicate,
communications between prosecutors and corporate counsel.241
Even though the 2008 Act attempts to provide the government
with a greater ability to ask questions about potentially privileged
material without violating the Act, the Act’s “Inapplicability” sec-
tion still might prevent the prosecutor from asking simple ques-
tions if the answers might reasonably involve privileged material.242
Moreover, any questions prosecutors do ask may subject the gov-
ernment to liability should a court decide to enforce the “reasona-
ble belief” standard.243  Thus, this section of the Act contains
another mechanism at once restricting prosecutorial action and po-
tentially expanding prosecutorial liability.
Viewed in their totality, these problems counsel against Senate
approval of the Privilege Protection Act.  The Act leaves corpora-
tions with the same predicaments they face under the DOJ corpo-
rate charging policy and would likely unnecessarily burden
prosecutors conducting white-collar investigations.  Under the Act,
corporations likely would continue to waive their privilege and
work-product protections.  Accordingly, corporations might con-
tinue to face increased third party liability.  Since after the imple-
mentation of the Privilege Protection Act corporations in all
likelihood would continue their privilege waiver practices, the Re-
vised DOJ Guidelines merit further analysis
B. The Revised DOJ Guidelines:  Corporate Cooperation as a
Best Practice
Considering the consequences of corporate indictment or convic-
tion, cooperation likely serves as the corporation’s best strategy to
avoid tangling with prosecutors.  As is often the case with individ-
ual defendants, where a corporation might be convinced of its own
and its employees’ innocence, it seems waiving corporate privilege
to convince the government of this belief provides a safer and more
effective strategy than digging in its heels and fighting the investi-
gation.  Often a corporate indictment and the resulting collateral
effects for shareholders and innocent employees are not in the gov-
ernment’s best interest either.244  Rather, both the corporation and
241. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
242. See id.; see also S. 3217, § 3014(c).
243. See S. 3217, § 3014(c).
244. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 330 (2007) (“Prosecutors are justifiably reluctant
to cause such extensive economic harm [that results from a corporate indictment].
When the DOJ announced the DPA [Deferred Prosecution Agreement] for AOL, for
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the government have a mutual interest in routing out the criminal
actors and restoring legal compliance within the corporation.  In
this light, the Revised DOJ Guidelines provide a workable corpo-
rate charging policy.  The Guidelines’ favorable consideration of a
corporation’s disclosure of the relevant facts, though it would often
entail privilege waiver, at least serves as an essential and clearly-
marked avenue for the corporation to avoid indictment.  The Re-
vised DOJ Guidelines are the latest formalization of the longstand-
ing cooperative practices that corporations have utilized to avoid
indictment.  A few examples of this practice will illuminate the
benefits of keeping the Revised DOJ Guidelines in place.
Before the recent spate of DOJ Memos revising corporate charg-
ing policies, corporations looking to survive fraud investigations
would waive their attorney-client privilege in order to cooperate
with the government.  As Michael A. Simons chronicles in his arti-
cle evaluating white-collar investigations of the mid-Eighties and
early Nineties as well as those of today:
Indeed, prosecutors put such great weight on cooperation that it
can often save a corporation from indictment even if the corpo-
ration lacked a meaningful compliance program, even if top
management knew about the criminal activity, and even if top
management was involved in the criminal activity.  To do this,
however, the corporation must cooperate so fully that it con-
vinces prosecutors that it is a “good corporate citizen.”245
Simons provides the examples of Salomon Brothers in June 1991
as the “gold standard of what prosecutors expect from corporations
under investigation.”246  In response to SEC and DOJ investiga-
tions into illegal bidding practices over government bonds and the
disclosure that Salomon’s top officers both knew and permitted the
misconduct, Warren Buffet, as Salomon’s largest shareholder, in-
tervened.247  Under Buffet’s direction, Salomon’s top three officers
resigned, Buffet became interim chairman and Salomon began co-
operating with the authorities:
Salomon not only provided documents and made employees
available for interviews, it also waived its attorney-client privi-
lege, provided detailed information about the firm’s own inter-
example, it stated that the agreement was designed to ‘achieve[ ] a result that mini-
mizes collateral damage to shareholders and employees while imposing an appropri-
ate punishment and protecting the rights of victims.’”) (citations omitted).
245. Simons, supra note 1, at 995.
246. Id. at 1002.
247. Id. at 1001.
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nal investigation, and, as described by federal prosecutors, took
“decisive and extraordinary actions to restructure its manage-
ment to avoid future misconduct.”  Nine months later, when
federal prosecutors announced that Salomon would not be pros-
ecuted, the United States Attorney specifically credited Salo-
mon’s “exemplary” and “unprecedented” cooperation.248
Simons also provides examples of white-collar investigations in
stark contrast with Salomon paradigm.
Corporations who refused to cooperate with prosecutors faced
corporate indictment, which likely entailed the corporation’s de-
mise.  Simons puts forth the examples of Drexel Burnham Lambert
in 1987 and Daiwa Bank in 1995 as examples of corporations that
denied any wrongdoing and decided to fight the government
charges.  After “vigorously den[ying] any wrongdoing [and] stead-
fastly defend[ing] its employees,” Drexel faced the potential of a
RICO indictment and then plead guilty to “six counts of fraud and
paid a $300 million fine.”249  Just months later, “Drexel had ceased
to exist, filing for bankruptcy, liquidating its assets and laying off
over 3,000 employees.”250
Daiwa Bank’s prosecution provides a similar cautionary tale.
The bank discovered a $1.1 billion fraud conducted by one of its
employees, did not report the discovery for two months, and then
resisted cooperating as prosecutors demanded.251  The government
indicted the bank “within weeks on multiple charges of conspiracy,
fraud, obstruction, falsification of bank records and misprision of
felony.  When Daiwa pled guilty four months later, it was ordered
to pay a $340 million fine.”252  Before then, bank regulators had
already forced Daiwa to cease operating in the United States.  At
Daiwa’s sentencing, the government scolded Daiwa, explaining
that if the employees’ crimes were the sole misconduct and the
Bank had provided meaningful cooperation, it would be unlikely
that Daiwa would have been charged at all.253
This pattern of cooperation continues in white-collar investiga-
tions today, with many corporations entering Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (“DPAs”) as a means of cooperating with the govern-
248. Id. at 1001-02 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 1000.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1005.
252. Id. at 1005-06.
253. See id. at 1006.
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ment.254  For instance, in a turbulent prosecution over illegal tax
shelters, KPMG entered into an extensive DPA with the DOJ that
would permit the DOJ to regulate and oversee significant aspects
of its business operations for at least three years.255  After much
negotiation and dispute, KPMG waived much of its attorney-client
privilege and submitted the results of its internal investigation to
the government.256  The corporate entity avoided indictment,
which likely would have been fatal for an accounting firm, while its
employees faced criminal charges.  The McNulty Memo allowed
the government to recognize privilege waivers as a form of cooper-
ation in its analysis of whether to indict the corporation.257  The
Revised DOJ Guidelines further the same ideal, but direct the gov-
ernment to gauge cooperation by factual disclosure instead of priv-
ilege waiver.  As Professor Daniel Richman notes, “[t]hreatening
to prosecute the [corporate] entity is a means to [prosecuting indi-
viduals], for without this threat the entity would be far more
tempted to protect the individuals . . . .”258  Thus, corporations are
able to utilize the DOJ charging policies’ structure to guide their
cooperation, and ultimately to survive criminal charges, while also
assisting in the prosecution of alleged wrongdoers.259  This mutu-
ally beneficial agreement is at the crux of all criminal cooperation.
Inasmuch as the proliferation of corporate cooperation agree-
ments might favor a “culture of waiver,” the benefits of waiving
broad rights to accept responsibility for criminal action in exchange
254. See Griffin, supra note 244, at 321-22 (“Deferred prosecution agreements are a R
form of probation, or ‘pretrial diversion,’ according to which the government agrees
to suspend charges against a company so long as the company fulfills every obligation
set forth in a detailed ‘contract.’  These agreements are a compromise intended to
split the difference between declination of prosecution and a guilty plea.”).
255. See id. at 324.
256. See United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding un-
constitutional the DOJ practice of pressuring KPMG to terminate its advancement of
attorney fees to employees); United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); see also Posting of Ellen S. Podgor to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2005/08/ (Aug. 30, 2005) (analyzing
a portion of the confidentiality agreement between KPMG and the DOJ regarding
attorney-client privilege); see generally Stein, supra note 77 (discussing the ethics and
constitutionality of the Thompson Memo’s advancement policies).
257. See McNulty Memo, supra note 73. R
258. Richman, supra note 22, at 322-30. R
259. See Griffin, supra note 244, at 323-26 (citing DPAs involving America Online, R
Computer Associates, and Bristol Myers Squibb as the government’s preferred coop-
eration agreement tool, and noting the examples of Reliant Energy and Milberg
Weiss as organizations refusing to enter into DPAs and waive attorney-client
privileges).
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for leniency is a hallmark of our justice system.260  Corporations
are interested in maximizing profitability, which favors avoidance
of criminal charges.  Thus, it is often in the corporation’s best inter-
est to waive certain rights and cooperate with the government, con-
sidering such a deal will likely allow them to turn a profit another
day.  Critics of waiver bemoan that corporations compromise their
privileges and throw their own employees under the bus in turning
statements to counsel over to the government.261  This problem,
however, stems more from the nature of the privilege, than the
DOJ charging policy.  The privilege belongs to the corporation for
use as the corporation deems fit, and thus, hardly could be con-
strued to protect employees when an employee’s interests diverge
from the corporation’s.
Although the corporate privilege serves to protect communica-
tions and advice from corporate counsel to corporate employees,
the corporation retains control of the privilege.262  As the Supreme
Court and current critics of privilege waiver correctly state, an em-
ployee’s ability to consult in confidence with counsel is a compel-
ling interest likely to enhance internal compliance with law.263  In
actuality, despite the Court’s grandiose language in Upjohn seeking
to protect communications between employees and corporate
260. S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing Sept. 18, 2007, supra note 150 (statement of R
Daniel Richman, Professor, Columbia Law School) (“[T]he fact is the entire federal
criminal justice system is based on a culture of waiver: most federal criminal defend-
ants plead guilty, and a very large percentage of them waive their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights . . . to avoid harsher sentences.”).
261. See David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New
World:  The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 147, 156-57 (2000) (“[C]ounsel and the employees of a corporation must con-
sider that the questions asked, the answers received and the advice rendered may
soon be in the hands of a prosecutor, competitors and civil litigants.  This possibility
has the effect of chilling the inquiry from the outset and often has an adverse impact
on the relationship among senior management and lower-level employees.”). But see
Richman, supra note 22, at 310-11 (noting that “there is some reason to believe that R
Upjohn warnings have become standard procedure,” and thus employees should be
well aware of the potential risk that their communications to corporate counsel will be
revealed to the government).
262. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 37 (“The Court made clear, however, that the privi-
lege belongs to the corporation as an entity, not to any of its agents.  Thus, when
officers and employees reveal confidences to corporate counsel for the purpose of
facilitating counsel’s provision of legal advice to the corporation, these confidences
are protected only as long as, and to the extent that, the corporation wishes to invoke
the privilege.”).
263. See Cole, supra note 43, at 491 (“Significantly, the core rationale of the R
Upjohn decision is the belief that confidentiality is essential if the societal interest in
fostering compliance with the law is to be served.”).
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counsel,264 the Court’s construction of the corporate privilege af-
fords little protection for the confidentiality of such communica-
tion.265  After communicating with corporate counsel, employees
essentially relinquish any ability to preserve their communications’
confidentiality; instead, the corporation now controls the confiden-
tiality of the statements.  When the government presses a corpora-
tion to cooperate, the corporation, if it wishes to obtain the most
favorable outcome, might have little choice but to waive its corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege.  Though it may not be a pleasant op-
tion for a corporation, the path to a cooperation agreement is well
worn by the many corporate and individual defendants before it:
“[i]t is a time-honored and accepted practice to reward the target
of a criminal investigation with favored treatment at charging or
sentencing in exchange for making the job of the prosecuting au-
thority easier.”266  Overall, privilege waivers serve both corporate
and government interests in avoiding corporate indictment, while
at the same time increasing the deterrent effect and efficiency of
employee prosecutions.  In light of this mutually beneficial ex-
change, it seems privilege waiver in white-collar investigations is a
practice that will remain in place despite the Revised DOJ
Guidelines.267
C. A Second Look at Selective Waiver
Since privilege waivers will likely continue to serve as a mainstay
of white-collar prosecutions under the current DOJ charging pol-
icy, Congress should take an additional step to protect corporations
from the harmful ramifications of such waivers.268  Although Con-
gress and the Rules Committee recently passed on enacting the
doctrine of selective waiver in Rule 502 and the courts have largely
refused to extend the doctrine,269 selective waiver remains at the
forefront of many proposals to counteract the harmful effects of
frequent privilege waivers.270  “[S]elective waiver permits the vol-
264. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
265. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
266. Richter, supra note 45, at 161-62 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, R
363 (1978)).
267. See Letter from Mark Filip to Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter, supra note
27. R
268. Richter, supra note 45, at 173-76. R
269. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., No. 21-MC-92, 2008 WL 400933, *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008); supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. R
270. See Richman, supra note 22, at 321 (“There are good arguments for legislative R
intervention to ensure that the entity forced to waive is not put at an unfair disadvan-
tage vis-a`-vis private plaintiffs.  Currently, only the Eighth Circuit has held that a
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untary and tactical sacrifice of confidentiality to a specified audi-
ence [a government agency or prosecutor’s office], while
permitting the holder of the privilege to maintain secrecy against
all others.”271 Thus, a corporation would no longer have to evalu-
ate its potential exposure to third party litigants in deciding initially
whether to waive its privilege for the government investigation.  As
corporate cooperation in white-collar investigations makes for effi-
cient and effective prosecutions, implementing the doctrine of se-
lective waiver would provide further incentive for corporations to
cooperate to an even greater extent.272  Enacting the doctrine of
selective waiver would provide much needed protection to corpo-
rate entities waiving their privilege to aid the government.273
In defending the merits of selective waiver, Michael Siegel iden-
tifies as critics’ chief concern that the doctrine would likely in-
crease the incidence of privilege waiver.  Siegel enumerates an
illustrative list of arguments that critics lodge against the doctrine
of selective waiver, and the waiver of privilege it necessarily en-
tails: “privilege wavier (1) deters corporate insiders from running
ideas by corporate counsel; (2) deters corporations from instituting
serious compliance programs; (3) deters corporations from con-
ducting internal investigations; and (4) deters corporate employees
from being forthcoming with counsel during the course of internal
investigations.”274  Additionally, critics claim that selective waiver
will encourage attorneys not to memorialize their findings in writ-
company’s disclosure of privileged materials in response to government investigative
demands will not result in its complete waiver of privilege as to all other parties under
federal law.”); Richter, supra note 45, at 134 (“This Article voices a view on selective R
waiver protection that is contrary to much of the current public disclosure on the
topic—that such protection would represent a salutary change to waiver doctrine that
would protect cooperating corporations from the damaging effects of third party
waivers, while at the same time serving the public interest in effective oversight of
business entities.”); Siegel, supra note 1, at 43 (“[Selective wavier] may very well
strike the correct balance between competing goals.”).
271. Richter, supra note 45, at 184. R
272. Alternatively, holding plaintiffs to higher pleading standards, as the Supreme
Court indicated in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), may have a simi-
lar, though less predictable effect. See also Cohen, supra note 4, at 160 (concluding as R
the result of “‘class action reform,’ the consequences of private litigation are less dras-
tic than they used to be”).
273. Although the frequent occurrence of waiver is evidence that the potential of a
criminal charge already provides a strong incentive to cooperate, selective wavier
would further enhance corporations’ willingness to do so. See Richter, supra note 45, R
at 181-84.
274. Siegel, supra note 1, at 32.
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ing to create less material that the government may encounter.275
This Note will address these arguments in turn.
First, corporate employees curious about the legality of certain
business practices should be more inclined to confer with corporate
counsel under the current corporate charging regime.276  The effi-
cacy of current white-collar prosecutions and the likelihood that
the corporation will perform a searching internal investigation
should deter employees from engaging in illegal conduct.  Employ-
ees less inclined to run ideas by counsel because they fear that
those communications would be delivered to the government likely
are trying to skirt the law.  Therefore, their communications with
counsel regarding planned or ongoing illegal activity likely would
not receive the protection of the privilege due to the crime-fraud
exception.277
Second, as Siegel succinctly argues, “[f]or most corporations, not
having a strong compliance department is simply not an option.”278
Complex regulatory regimes maintained by the SEC and the EPA
require strict compliance and often provide steep penalties for in-
discretion.  The possibility of civil suits following such a breach is
further motivation for the corporation to bolster its legal compli-
ance program.279  Moreover, corporations truly interested in avoid-
ing illegal conduct realize that a healthy compliance program
would likely keep their organization out of trouble in the first
place.  Taking preventative measures against crime protects the
company to a much greater extent than solely relying on a complex
criminal defense plan for when illegality actually occurs.
Third, corporations cannot afford to abstain from an internal in-
vestigation even though the results likely will be presented to the
government.  The current DOJ corporate charging regime strongly
favors corporate cooperation.  If a corporation fails to conduct a
sufficient internal investigation, it would have little information to
share with the government, and then presumably, would increase
275. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., No. 21-MC-92, 2008 WL 400933, *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008).
276. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 33.
277. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003); In
re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (“‘The Privilege
takes flight if the relation is abused.  A client who consults an attorney for advice that
will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must
let the truth be told.’” (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933))).
278. Siegel, supra note 1, at 33.
279. See id. at 33-34.
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its likelihood of facing criminal charges.280  Additionally, the risk of
third party and regulatory liability would continue to threaten a
corporation that did not adequately discover the extent of the al-
leged conduct so that it could defend itself in a civil suit.281  Lastly,
high-level corporate officers who decline to investigate allegations
of their subordinates’ criminal conduct, risk perceived acquies-
cence to the criminal conduct and possible liability if the govern-
ment decides to investigate at a later date.282
Fourth, the infirmities of the corporate privilege as the Court
constructed it in Upjohn likely provide the greatest deterrent to
employees’ willingness to disclose information to an internal inves-
tigation.283  Proper Upjohn warnings are crucial to avoid ethical
lapses on behalf of corporate counsel and should be standard prac-
tice in such a situation.284  Nevertheless, employees may not have
much choice but to speak with internal investigators if they want to
keep their jobs.285  Thus, unless employees have engaged in poten-
tially criminal conduct that might lead them to assert their Fifth
Amendment rights, their interests would direct them to be candid
with internal investigators, particularly where lying would likely
cost them their employment or hurt their defense should they later
face criminal charges.  If the government and internal investigators
are already scrutinizing the corporation, a lie will not easily go un-
280. See Richter, supra note 45, at 173 (“In sum, it is difficult to imagine competent R
counsel working to protect the best interests of their corporate client consistent with
their ethical obligations by undercutting internal investigations or other compliance
programs . . . .”).
281. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 35 (“A corporation that suspects criminality in its
midst simply cannot afford to ignore it:  the risks of regulatory and third-party liability
are too high.”).
282. See id.
283. Richter, supra note 45, at 173 (“If . . . an internal investigation revealed damn-
ing information about isolated actors only, it would be in the company’s best interests
to uncover the information and turn it over to the government even if it would harm
the interests of the individual employees implicated by the investigation.”); Siegel,
supra note 1, at 38-39 (“[Employees cooperating in an internal investigation, find R
themselves in a situation] not dictated by the possibility that the DOJ might make a
future request for privilege waiver.  Rather, it rests on the mere ability of the corpora-
tion, post-Upjohn, to waive privilege voluntarily in any situation it sees fit. Upjohn
puts the employee at risk.”).
284. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; see also Siegel, supra note 1, at R
39 (discussing the requirement of MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(f), which
requires a lawyer representing the organization to inform employees if the corpora-
tion’s interest may be adverse to theirs).
285. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 38-39 (“A potentially guilty employee thus faces a
dismal set of options:  (1) silence, and likely termination; (2) cooperation, and likely
sanctions; and (3) lying, perhaps avoiding liability in the short term, but running the
risk of worse consequences in the future.”).
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detected.  In light of the scant protection the corporate privilege
provides employees, one solution is for employees to consult their
own legal counsel from the beginning of the potential problem.286
Finally, internal investigators are unlikely to restrict their written
records out of concern that those documents will later be revealed
to the government.  Such an argument is based on an illogical pre-
mise: “defense counsel’s argument that their duty of effective rep-
resentation requires them to compromise the investigation sounds
very much like an argument that a lawyer’s ethical duty to the en-
tity requires—in light of the possibility of prospective privilege
waiver requests—that lawyers commit malpractice while investigat-
ing.”287  In these situations, cooperation is often the ultimate goal.
Accordingly, internal investigators aim to present the government
with the most detailed picture possible of corporate misdeeds in
order to fulfill their end of a cooperation agreement.  Failure to
include pertinent information in disclosures to the government
might lead the government to later revoke cooperation agreements
after discovering the wrong.288  Or even worse, in certain egregious
circumstances such action could result in obstruction charges
against the law firm doing the internal investigation and presenting
its finding to the government.289  Thus, the DOJ corporate charging
regime continues to provide powerful incentives for the corpora-
tion to conduct a thorough internal investigation and share its re-
sults for cooperation credit.  Any proposal to protect corporations
from the harm privilege waiver may entail should begin with a rec-
ognition of this reality.
In this light, selective waiver could work hand-in-hand with the
Revised DOJ Guidelines to protect corporations from certain dele-
terious ramifications of privilege waivers.  The Guidelines’ empha-
sis on the disclosure of relevant facts as a measure of cooperation
goes to the heart of what the government seeks from a corporation
trying to avoid indictment.  In any investigation the government
wants to discover what happened and whether that conduct merits
a criminal charge.  The corporation generally is inclined to share
that information, and more, with the government in order to avoid
a criminal charge.  If, however, in cooperating with the government
the corporation waives its attorney-client privilege and work-prod-
286. See id. at 41.
287. Richman, supra note 22, at 305 (internal quotations omitted). R
288. See id. at 308 (“A savvy federal enforcer will not stay within the four-corners
of an internal investigation report . . . .”).
289. See id. at 305.
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uct protections, the corporation might cripple its ability to fight the
civil suits likely to follow the government action.  Selective waiver
would provide an essential shield to corporations as they disclose
the factual information the Revised DOJ Guidelines seek.  With
legal fees and civil liability reduced, corporate counsel then would
have even further incentive to turn over the essential factual infor-
mation often crucial to a successful prosecution of white-collar in-
dividuals.  With cooperation serving as the surest way to avoid
indictment, adoption of selective waiver would square theoretical
notions of the corporate attorney-client privilege with its role in
practice.  The corporate privilege is so often waived to gain leni-
ency from the government that it rarely protects employees and
functions more as an instrument to gain leverage during negotia-
tions with the government.  Thus, adopting selective waiver to ac-
company the Revised DOJ Guidelines would serve both the
government and the corporation’s best interest.
CONCLUSION
The increased occurrence of corporate privilege waivers provides
both significant benefits and concerns, a dialectic that plays out in
the debate over whether to pass the Privilege Protection Act.  This
Note supports continuing the corporate charging policy the Re-
vised DOJ Guidelines set forth, and enhancing the Guidelines’ ef-
fectiveness by providing the additional protection of selective
waiver to a cooperating corporation.  Thus, this Note counsels
against passage of the Privilege Protection Act.  The Act would
only frustrate the DOJ corporate charging policy, likely without
altering the occurrence of waiver, but at the same time, rendering
prosecutions needlessly complex.  Furthermore, as Professor
Daniel Richman notes, “the attorney-client waiver ‘problem’ ought
to be toward the bottom of a long list of interrelated issues, includ-
ing the scope of corporate liability, the scope of corporate privi-
leges, and the funding of white collar enforcement units.”290
Barring any significant alterations to the white-collar landscape,
Congress should consider enacting selective waiver provisions,
which, in practice, would do much to ease the concerns of those
who vehemently oppose the DOJ corporate charging policy.  Fi-
nally, it is important to remember that the continued success of any
290. Richman, supra note 22, at 320. R
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DOJ corporate charging policy will hinge on prosecutors adhering
not just to the policy’s terms, but also to the highest ethical
standards.
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